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Abstract

The United States engaged in coercive democratization (bringing
democracy to a country via coercive measures such as occupation) endeavors in
both Japan and Iraq, achieving drastically different results. The democratization
of Japan is typically regarded as the gold standard of coercive democratization
due to Japan’s rapid social and economic development following the United
States’ occupation of the country in the years after World War II. The United
States’ democratization effort in Iraq, on the other hand, has failed to create such
prosperous conditions and has arguably made Iraq more unstable. This thesis
seeks to identify why coercive democratization worked in Japan yet failed in Iraq
by analyzing a myriad of factors that potentially influenced the outcome of the
United States’ democratization efforts in both countries, including factors such as
each nation’s history of colonialism, its level of ethnic and religious homo or
heterogeneity, historical internal stability/instability, as well as the dedication of
resources by the United States to each democratization effort. Ultimately, this
thesis aims to contribute an answer to the broader question of whether or not
coercive democratization is a worthwhile endeavor for the United States to pursue
in the future by attempting to unearth parameters that influence the success or
failure of coercive democratization attempts.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Research Questions:
The questions that this thesis seeks to address are: Why did the United
States’ coercive democratization attempt succeed in post-WWII Japan yet fail in
Iraq and were there specific internal conditions for the coercive democratization
attempts in Japan and Iraq that contributed to the attempts’ respective success and
failure?
I define coercive democratization as an attempt by one or more external
powers to impose a democratic political structure on another country. Common
coercive democratization tactics employed by countries such as the United States
are regime change and occupation. Ever since World War II, the United States of
America has been a major player in international affairs, and one of the most hotly
contested of the United States’ foreign endeavors is the United States’ increasing
commitment to the idea that democracy can be spread through a process called
regime change. As Richard Haass describes it, “[r]egime change allows a state to
solve its problems with another state by removing the offensive regime there and
replacing it with a less offensive one.”1 Going hand in hand with regime change is
the concept of nation-building, or the “armed occupation and intrusive involvement
in the internal politics of [a country].”2 The United States has decided to employ
these tactics quite liberally in modern times, yet has failed to achieve the standard
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it set by coercively democratizing Japan and Germany via occupation and regime
change in recent years.3
The United States occupied Japan from 1945-1952 following the United
States’ defeat of the Axis Powers (of which Japan was a member) during World
War II. The United States entered World War II not to democratize Japan, but to
respond to an act of aggression by Japan towards the United States, namely the
bombing of Pearl Harbor in the U.S. state, Hawaii, in 1941. The occupation was
well planned by the Department of State and was overseen by General Douglas
MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, as well as the
predominantly American group SCAP, which shares the same name as
MacArthur’s title. Democratizing Japan through demilitarization, rewriting the
Japanese constitution, and reforming the Japanese economy were integral parts of
the United States’ occupation of Japan. The democratization of Japan was also
planned to be a somewhat lengthy endeavor that would require a significant
dedication of resources to complete.
The United States entered Iraq on very different terms. The United States
was not attacked by Iraq and entered the country without international approval
under the premise that Saddam Hussein, the dictator of Iraq, possessed weapons of
mass destruction (WMDs) and that the WMDs were likely to fall into the hands of
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terrorists.4 As was the case in Japan, the occupation of Iraq was planned prior to
the invasion by the Department of State, yet unlike in the case of Japan, the
Department of State’s plan to democratize Iraq was thrown out by the United States.
The occupation itself was overseen by the Office for Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) which was led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer.
Bremer would go on to make a series of mistakes, such as disbanding the Iraqi
Army, that would significantly hinder the democratization of Iraq. Also, the United
States was unwilling to commit the resources necessary to democratize Iraq from
the get-go, resulting in an understaffed operation that lacked many basic occupation
facets such as adequate safety equipment and personnel.
The outcomes of the United States’ occupations of Japan and Iraq are just
as different as their origins. Often referred to as the “gold standard” of coercive
democratization attempts are the transformations of Imperial Japan and Nazi
Germany from violent, militaristic regimes into “peaceful, prosperous, vibrant
democracies.”5 On the other hand exists the United States’ coercive
democratization operation in Iraq, which arguably left the country worse off, or at
least no better off, in terms of safety and stability than the nation was before U.S.
involvement. For example, the removal of Hussein and his Baathist regime and the
subsequent U.S. occupation of Iraq have resulted in internal violence within Iraq
that has resulted in the deaths of about 461,000 Iraqi civilians.6 In contrast, during
4
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the entirety of Hussein’s authoritarian rule about 250,000 Iraqi civilians had gone
missing or were killed.7
Similarly, while the United States did succeed in democratizing the Iraqi
political system, it would be an overstatement to say that Iraq’s democracy is
“vibrant.” For example, in May 2018, the Iraqi elections were “contested on a scale
that damaged their credibility,” and 156 members of the Iraqi parliament drafted a
law aiming to nullify the election results.8 Even though Iraqi elections are
considered to be competitive due to the abundance of political parties that compete
for seats in the Iraqi parliament, “low institutional capacity, widespread corruption
and extensive Iranian influence, have hindered the ability of elected officials to
independently set and implement laws and policies,” thus undermining the
legitimacy of elections in the country.9 The seemingly detrimental impact that the
coercive democratization attempt in Iraq has had on the country’s civilian
population certainly opens the door for questions to be asked about the validity and
benefits of pursuing coercive democratization operations, even if the government
that replaced Saddam’s Baathist government is substantially more democratic in
nature.

Study,” p. 10, PLOS Medicine, October 15, 2013,
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001533.
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accessed March 14, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2004/01/25/war-iraq-not-humanitarianintervention.
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9
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2021, https://freedomhouse.org/country/iraq/freedom-world/2021.
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Competing Theories on Coercive Democratization:
Political scientists have offered several theories as to when coercive
democratization can succeed. These conditions include factors that predate the
democratization attempt, such as the strength of governing institutions and a
country’s level of ethnic heterogeneity; the way that the democratization is planned
for and carried out; and the motivations of leaders in the democratizing country.
Benjamin Denison notes in a Cato Institute policy brief that coercive
democratization is rarely successful, and that when it is, there are several
preconditions, such as strong governing institutions, previous experience with
democracy, and economic modernization that can explain the few success stories
of coercive democratization that do exist.10 In fact, Denison is of the opinion that
the successful coercive democratization attempts in Japan and Germany are the
explicit results of, as he calls them, “distinct economic and political
preconditions.”11 For example, Denison highlights the “robust” governing
apparatuses in Japan that existed prior to the United States’ invasion as a major
factor as to why coercive democratization succeeded in Japan and Germany’s
history of democracy as a reason why coercive democratization succeeded in
Germany.12
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Another theory about the conditions under which coercive democratization
is likely to be successful is offered by Jeffrey Pickering and Mark Peceny. In their
study of coercive democratization, they note that, “states that have been present on
the international stage for longer periods of time are more stable, and hence more
likely to have the types of political environments that foster democracy.”13
Pickering and Peceny make this claim since lengthy periods of statehood have
historically appeared to foster democracy, even in states that endured long periods
of authoritarian control such as is the case in many South American countries.
Pickering and Peceny also argue that high levels of “institutional ethnic
conflict,” in which ethnic political organizations and parties play central roles in
politics and ethnic discrimination is widespread, such as in the staffing of key
government offices, negatively correlate with a country’s ability to democratize.
Finally, Pickering and Peceny argue that certain aspects of a country’s cultural
traditions could negatively influence democracy. In particular, they cite literature
pertaining to the idea that Muslim and Arab culture is “antithetical to democracy,”
noting the struggles that many Arab and Muslim countries have had insofar as
democratization goes.14 While it would be intriguing and perhaps even worthwhile
to analyze Japanese and Muslim/Arab culture to see if there are any explanations
for the success of coercive democratization in Japan and failure of democratization
in Iraq, this thesis will not address questions of whether particular cultural traditions
are more or less hospitable to democracy.

13

Jeffrey Pickering and Mark Peceny, "Forging Democracy at Gunpoint," International Studies
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While Denison and Pickering and Peceny highlight aspects of a country’s
political, economic, and cultural experience that predate imposition by a foreign
power, Bruce De Mesquita and George Downs contend that the motivations of a
foreign leader for intervening and remaining in control of a foreign political system
strongly influence the likelihood of successful coercive democratization. In their
“selectorate” theory, “[the motivation of the leader of the invading power] to retain
power and the institutional context in which he or she operates play a major role in
determining a state’s policy choices.”15
De Mesquita and Downs note that “an intervening democratic state is most
interested in reversing the policies that precipitated its intervention in the first
place,” and mentions that sometimes creating a democracy is perceived as the most
efficient way to do so by democratic leaders.16 Following the logic of the selectorate
theory, a leader might also be less interested in establishing a democracy if there is
too much uncertainty in the ability for a democracy to take hold in a foreign nation.
A failure on behalf of the intervening state to establish a democracy via regime
change, for example, might actually weaken the intervening nation’s leader
politically at home, since the operation could be viewed as a waste of money and
effort by the intervening nation’s citizens if a democracy is not established in the
invaded country.
This phenomenon, according to de Mesquita, encourages an intervening
nation’s leaders to establish friendly autocracies (or rigged democracies) in the
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nation being subjected to regime change rather than attempt to fully democratize
the target nation. Those autocracies/rigged democracies might be less beneficial for
the people living in the nation than the prior autocratic power in practice, yet the
intervening nation’s leader might turn a blind eye to that conundrum if they can
pitch the regime change endeavor as a “victory” to their constituents at home,
leaving the nation they intervened in worse off in the process.
Essentially, de Mesquita’s point is that occupying nations’ leaders are more
likely to engage in efforts to truly democratize a country if they perceive the
establishment of a democracy in the occupied country as a.) more beneficial to the
leader/nation as a whole (is the prospect of democratic elections good for the
leader/nation or would the leader/nation be better served by a friendly autocrat) and
b.) politically popular at home (would the citizens that elected the leader conducting
the democratization be more satisfied with democratization of the target nation than
regime change).
Similar to de Mesquita and Downs, Jonathan Monten and James Meernik
also highlight the importance of particular indicators that occur after coercive
democratization has begun. Monten argues that unless a state targets the underlying
political institutions of a regime with its coercive democratization attempt and helps
facilitate substantial pro-democracy reformations such as by sponsoring elections
(which notably the U.S. did in Iraq), democratization is an unlikely outcome.17 The
tactics employed by the United States in Japan significantly differed from those
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employed in Iraq insofar as reforming political institutions went. In the case of
constitutional reforms, for example, the United States imposed a constitution upon
the Japanese during occupation whereas in the case of Iraq the United States played
the role of a mediator between various religious and ethnic interests in the crafting
of an Iraqi constitution that was ultimately created by Iraqis.
Similarly, in Japan, the United States devoted considerable time and effort
to fundamentally changing the economic and social structures present in Japan to
make them suitable for a liberal democracy to flourish, whereas leadership change
was clearly the primary goal of regime change in Iraq. For example, the United
States engaged in major trust-busting and land reformation operations in occupied
Japan whereas in Iraq, a recent college graduate was tasked with the incredibly
complex task of reforming the Iraqi stock exchange.18
James Meernik puts forth a theory that the desire of the population
experiencing regime change plays a factor in the outcome of coercive
democratization efforts. Meernik argues that although there exists no conclusive
data concerning the opinions of people who have had their country occupied by the
United States before an occupation is already in place, it is possible to gauge a
population’s affinity for the United States’ democratization attempts by analyzing
how populations treat U.S. military and civilian personnel during occupations.19
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Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring
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Each of the given explanations are intriguing and convincing in their own
ways, and the answer to the question of why coercive democratization succeeded
in Japan yet failed in Iraq is most likely a product of a combination of the given
hypotheses. In other words, there is no single answer that holistically explains the
success of coercive democratization in Japan and the failure of coercive
democratization in Iraq. Instead, there are multiple reasons for the success of
coercive democratization in Japan and its failure in Iraq, including the policies
implemented by the United States during its occupations of Japan and Iraq, the
ethnic and religious makeups of Japan and Iraq, and the histories and internal
stabilities/instabilities of Japan and Iraq.
A Preliminary Analysis of Coercive Democratization Theories to Japan and
Iraq:
As can be seen, a plenitude of theories that could describe the apparent
success of regime change in Japan and the failure of regime change in Iraq have
been put forward by academics. The ones that apply most clearly to the cases of
Japan and Iraq and help us to understand the success seen in Japan and the failure
seen in Iraq are Denison and Monten’s theories concerning pre-existing
governmental structures and an occupying country’s occupation policies, as well as
Pickering and Peceny’s theories concerning a state’s age and institutional ethnic
conflict. The case of Iraq also strongly suggests that Meerrnik’s theory concerning
a target population’s acceptance of its occupiers can be an important factor in the
outcome of a coercive democratization attempt despite his inability to offer
concrete proof of this being a universal truth. Likewise, de Mesquita’s “selectorate”
12

theory appears relevant in light of the first-hand account of the Iraqi occupation
from U.S. Ambassador Barbara Bodine who participated in the occupation as
Coordinator for the Central Region of Iraq under ORHA that I was able to obtain
via an interview. In the interview, Bodine suggested that Vice President Dick
Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were more interested in
installing a pro-U.S. government in Iraq than democratizing the country.
Denison and Monten both argue that “foreign regime-change operations are
often ineffective and produce deleterious side effects.”20 Denison’s point about the
existence of strong governing institutions in a state prior to occupation as well as
Monten’s point that an occupying country’s policies impact the outcome of
coercive democratization attempts explain the success of the Japanese case well.21
For example, the U.S. did not have to create strong governing institutions
in Japan as it has attempted to do in states that had weak governing apparatuses like
Iraq. For example, when the United States occupied Japan following World War II,
Japan boasted (and still boasts) the world’s oldest continuous hereditary monarchy
and had been consistently expanding its territorial control for a decade when the
military was essentially acting as the de facto governing body of Japan following
its invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Even though the military exercised most political
power in Japan from that point onward, the institutions of the Emperor and the
Japanese Diet remained intact and operated somewhat normally during the

20
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military’s tenure as the ultimate arbiter of Japanese political power although fueling
the Japanese war machine became their primary goal, thus aligning them with the
military.22 The fact that these institutions survived the military’s seizure of power
provided the United States with a basis from which to reform the Japanese political
system, and the United States’ decision to keep the Emperor position would prove
beneficial for reasons explored in a later chapter.
On the other hand, when the United States entered Iraq in 2003, Iraq was
essentially two countries (Kurdistan had been operating autonomously since 1991)
and had experienced several changes in leadership since the Ottoman Empire fell
in 1918. Pickering and Peceny’s theory concerning state age also seems to be quite
relevant in light of this factor, for Japan had existed for over 300 years as a
sovereign nation before the United States occupied it whereas Iraq had only existed
with its current boundaries for 71 years when the United States invaded in 2003
and had been plagued by leadership change and internal strife throughout its
independence. The histories of these two countries will be analyzed in later chapters
for their histories significantly influenced the outcome of the United States’
attempts to democratize these two states.
Similarly, Hussein weakened his own government by continually
conducting political purges of the military, even though his control of Iraq rested
in the military’s hands.23 In other words, whereas the Japanese military had
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successfully kept Japan united, Saddam Hussein’s Baathist government failed to
retain control over a large portion of its territory and was plagued by routine purges
which eroded the efficiency of Hussein’s government. In fact, “the [governing
institutions of Iraq] had effectively withdrawn from the detailed management of the
country, except in a few vital areas necessary for the immediate survival and
continuation of the regime,” by the time the United States had invaded, meaning
that institutionally the United States was left with very few options other than
rebuilding the Iraqi government from scratch by the time it started its occupation
of Iraq.24
Denison also argues that recent attempts to coercively democratize nations
have been directed towards “weak states,” such as Iraq, that lack these
preconditions, thus resulting in the practice’s continued failure.25
In the case of Japan, the fact that the U.S. only had to reform Japan’s
existing state institutions to promote liberalism makes the argument that existing
strong governing institutions provide fertile grounds for coercive democratization
to succeed very convincing. However, in the case of Iraq, this argument does not
take into account the fact that the United States deprived the Iraqi state of many
talented individuals via purging most qualified Iraqis from civil service positions
due to their membership in the recently ousted Baath Party. In Japan, the political
purges conducted by the United States left in place the vast majority of the Japanese
bureaucracy and even the Emperor. It would appear that this particular difference
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in occupation policy had major impacts on the respective success and failure of the
coercive democratization attempts in Japan and Iraq. The impacts of these crucial
policy decisions will be explored in great depth in later chapters.
Similarly, the planning employed by the United States in Japan significantly
differed from that which it employed in Iraq. The regime change operation in Japan
was far better planned than the regime change operation that was ultimately pursued
in Iraq. In the case of Japan, the United States had crafted a plan to democratize the
country prior to its intervention and followed it through. In the case of Iraq, an indepth plan to democratize the country was indeed formulated prior to the
occupation, yet it was discarded by the United States, much to the detriment of the
coercive democratization of Iraq as a whole. The reasons for the dismissal of the
plan for democratizing Iraq that dealt a fatal blow to the operation will be explored
further in a later chapter.
Pickering and Peceny’s theory that the existence of institutional ethnic
conflict hinders democratization also appear to be pertinent to the success of the
coercive democratization attempt in Japan and the failure of the attempt pursued in
Iraq. Japan is an ethnically homogenous society; 98% of the country is ethnically
Japanese. As a result, ethnic discrimination has been somewhat of a non-issue in
terms of the stability of Japanese society throughout its existence due to the fact
that there is an overwhelming ethnic majority in the country that practically does
not need to consider minority rights in its policy implementations. Religion also
does not play a major role in Japanese society and most Japanese are practitioners
of Shintoism and Buddhism. However, Iraq is a different case. Iraq is an ethnically
16

and religiously heterogenous society. There are three sizeable ethnic and religious
groups in Iraqi society, the Arab Sunnis, Arab Shi’a, and Kurds, most of whom are
Sunnis. They comprise about 20 percent, 60 percent, and 20 percent of Iraqi society
respectively. Political power has also been concentrated in the hands of the Arab
Sunnis, a minority group, for the entirety of the modern-day country of Iraq’s
existence and even before when it was part of the Ottoman Empire. The idea of
ethnic and religious homo and heterogeneity will be discussed at length throughout
the thesis for it is seemingly the most important factor in the success of coercive
democratization in Japan and the failure of coercive democratization in Iraq.
Meernik’s theory that a population’s acceptance of a coercive
democratization attempt is predicative of the democratization’s success is perhaps
more pertinent to Iraq than Japan, but it is worth entertaining. In the case of Japan,
the Japanese were subject to an unconditional surrender which their leader,
Emperor Hirohito, facilitated and accepted himself. There was little room left for
the Japanese to resist U.S. occupation; the Japanese had suffered a total defeat in a
war they instigated and had to suffer the consequences.
On the other hand, the Iraqis did not ask the United States to overthrow
Saddam Hussein. Sure, several influential expatriates and perhaps some Shi’a and
Kurds who had suffered at the hands of the Baathists might have truly desired an
end to Hussein’s regime, but the United States invaded Iraq of its own free will
with an explicit intent to bring democracy to a people who had never asked for it.
Even though Meernik ultimately comes to the conclusion that anti-U.S. sentiments
among the target population in a coercive democratization attempt “[do] not appear
17

to be a crucial factor” in the democratization of a target nation, it is important to
note that, at least in the case of Iraq (which had not occurred when Meernik wrote
his work) it would appear that anti-U.S. sentiments, especially among the Sunni
Arab population who felt unjustly targeted by U.S. occupation policies, played a
significant role in the United States’ failure to democratize Iraq.26
De Mesquita and Downs’ theory pertaining to democratic leaders’ interests
in democratizing autocratic states might be the most pessimistic theory concerning
coercive democratization that this thesis entertains, but it does in fact warrant
consideration given its particular applications to the case of Iraq. De Mesquita and
Downs note that “an intervening democratic state is most interested in reversing the
policies that precipitated its intervention in the first place,” and mentions that
sometimes creating a democracy is perceived as the most efficient way to do so by
democratic leaders.27 Under his selectorate theory, the political leaders of the
United States who orchestrated the establishment of democracies in Japan and
Germany did so because the leaders of the United States figured that their citizens
would not tolerate a resurgence in militarism in the former Axis Powers after having
devoted an exorbitant amount of resources to winning a major war with the intent
of eliminating militarism within Japan and Germany. In the case of Japan, the
United States viewed creating a democracy as the easiest way to ensure that
militarism was purged from Japanese society and appease its own people after
putting them through the hardships of a costly war.

26
27

Meernik, p. 399.
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Following the logic of the selectorate theory, a leader might also be less
interested in establishing a democracy if there is too much uncertainty in the ability
for a democracy to take hold in a foreign nation. A failure on behalf of the
intervening state to establish a democracy via regime change, for example, might
actually weaken the intervening nation’s leader politically at home, since the
operation could be viewed as a waste of money and effort by the intervening
nation’s citizens if a democracy is not established in the invaded country. This
phenomenon, according to de Mesquita and Downs, encourages an intervening
nation’s leaders to establish friendly autocracies (or rigged democracies) in the
nation being subjected to regime change rather than attempt to fully democratize
the target nation.28 Those autocracies/rigged democracies might be less beneficial
for the people living in the nation than the prior autocratic power in practice, yet
the intervening nation’s leader might turn a blind eye to that conundrum if they can
pitch the regime change endeavor as a “victory” to their constituents at home,
leaving the nation they intervened in worse off in the process. Of particular
importance to this thesis and its case study of Iraq is that U.S. Ambassador Barbara
Bodine, Coordinator for the Central Region of Iraq during the initial invasion,
subscribes to this theory insofar as the United States’ coercive democratization
attempt in Iraq goes. Bodine’s argument will be presented in a later chapter.
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Outline
The first chapter of this thesis will focus on Japan prior to the United
States’ occupation. It will trace Japanese history from the Tokugawa Era (1603)
to 1945 when the United States began its occupation. This time frame was
selected since the state of Japan had been unified from this period onward. This
chapter will focus primarily on the history of the Japanese state and attempt to
identify any factors that could have contributed to the United States’ successful
coercive democratization of Japan.
The second chapter will delve into the United States’ actual occupation of
Japan. This section will answer key questions such as: Was the occupation of
Japan planned? Were the occupation plans actualized? What specific policies or
reformations did the United States implement in Japan during the occupation? Did
the United States make any mistakes during the occupation? Essentially, a myriad
of factors will be examined to help understand why the occupation of Japan was a
success.
The third chapter will switch the focus of the thesis to Iraq. Much like
with Japan, the history of Iraq will be analyzed for any factors that could have
contributed to the failure of the coercive democratization attempt the United
States conducted in Iraq. Since it is relevant to this thesis, the time frame for Iraq
(1800-2003) will also include analyses of the territory that is now modern-day
Iraq when it was both still a part of the Ottoman Empire prior to 1922 and when it
was a colonial possession of the British from 1922-1932. It would not do the
analysis of Iraq justice to exclude its history as part of the Ottoman Empire and as
20

a colonial possession since many of the issues modern-day Iraq faces are quite
similar to the issues the Iraq of the Ottoman Empire and colonial Iraq faced.
Likewise, since the history of Japan is traced back nearly 300 years, it is
appropriate to elongate the time frame of analyses for Iraq past its modern-day
iteration since Iraq has only been an independent nation for 89 years to make the
comparison more equal.
The fourth chapter will, as the second chapter does with Japan, analyze the
actual occupation of Iraq by the United States. This chapter will feature a section
dedicated to highlighting any differences between the United States’ coercive
democratization attempts in Japan and Iraq in order to isolate variables that could
have contributed to the success experienced in Japan and the failure experienced
in Iraq. It will address the same questions that the second chapter seeks to answer
in relation to Japan, with a focus on highlighting aspects of the United States’
occupation of Iraq that contributed to its failure.
The fifth chapter will feature the conclusion to the thesis, in which the
research questions, being, why did the United States’ coercive democratization
attempt succeed in post-WWII Japan yet fail in Iraq and were there specific
internal conditions for the coercive democratization attempts in Japan and Iraq
that contributed to the attempts’ respective success and failure, will be answered.
Here, any differences between the two countries’ histories or experiences with
occupation under the United States will be compared to identify the key factors
that contributed to the success of coercive democratization in Japan and its failure
in Iraq.
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The overall findings of the thesis are that the United States’ failure to
democratize Iraq via coercion and its successful coercive democratization of
Japan was the result of both external and internal factors. Insofar as external
factors go, the United States did not devote an adequate amount of resources to
the coercive democratization effort in Iraq and made several serious blunders in
how it handled the occupation itself policy-wise. While the United States did
make some arguably bad decisions in the case of the occupation of Japan, these
blunders were not debilitating and were far outweighed by the good decisions
made in the coercive democratization effort in Japan.
Concerning internal factors, the relative historic stability of Japan as well
as the country’s homogeneity appear to have positively influenced the coercive
democratization of Japan whereas the historic instability of Iraq and its
heterogeneity appear to have hindered the coercive democratization effort in Iraq.
In essence, the presence or absence of these external and internal factors led to the
success of coercive democratization of Japan and the failed coercive
democratization of Iraq.
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Chapter 2: Japan Before Occupation
Japan has historically embraced a tradition of “[realism, opportunism,
respect for power, and [a] pursuit of status and autonomy],” from the country’s
origins as a hodgepodge collection of warring states to its modern-day status as a
unified nation.29 Even though Japan is an incredibly old state with various periods
of unification and disunion peppering its history, Japan had existed as a relatively
unified country for over 300 years prior to the United States’ occupation of the
country in 1945.
There are four main periods of Japanese history that transpired in the
centuries prior to the United States’ occupation of Japan following the country’s
defeat during World War II in which the entirety of Japan was under the control
of a centralized government and in which the Japanese ethos, so to speak, is
clearly on display. Those periods are called the Tokugawa, Meiji, Taisho, and
Showa eras. Of particular relevance is the fact that from the beginning of the
Tokugawa era in 1603 until the start of World War II in 1941 when Japan
embraced fascism and allied itself with the Axis Powers, Japan was a relatively
stable, unified nation internally.
The relative internal stability of Japan from the Tokugawa era onward is
largely due to the homogeneity of the country (about 98% of people living in
Japan are ethnically Japanese) as well as an overwhelmingly accepted social and
political culture that emphasizes the health of the nation, or collective, and social
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cohesion over individualism and diversity of thought and culture.30 Similarly, the
majority of Japanese practice either Shintoism, Buddhism, or both.31 Shintoism is
primarily a system of ancestral worship that offers no stringent moral code for its
followers to observe and Japanese Buddhism focuses primarily on the harmony of
the soul meaning that religious zealotry, violent or otherwise, was not widespread
in the country.32,33 Political dissent was present in some form throughout each of
the aforementioned eras of unified control in Japan, yet the country never
dissolved and remained under the control of a central authority throughout each of
these eras.
Likewise, Japan’s geographic status as an island nation, while becoming a
curse once Japan fully embraced an expansionist mantra during World War II due
to the lack of natural resources on the islands of Japan, made the nation hard to
access, thus limiting the threat of invasion and colonization. In essence, these
factors combined contributed to the unified governance of Japan from the
Tokugawa era onward.
Similarly, the relative political and social stability of the nation no doubt
benefited from the facts that Japan was never colonized or occupied until World
War II and that Japan self-consciously cut itself off from Western trade and
religion until the late 19th Century which limited the diversity of thought and
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culture present in Japan and helped foster the growth of nationalism among the
Japanese.
The Tokugawa Era (1603-1867)
In 1603, samurai warrior Tokugawa Ieyasu was appointed shogun, or
supreme military leader, of Japan by the country’s largely symbolic imperial court
after defeating his rivals for the throne in various battles. Ieyasu’s appointment
brought an end to the Warring States Period (1467-1615) in Japan which was
characterized by internal warfare between regional warlords, or daimyo, and
resulted in peaceful shogunate rule of a unified Japan for 264 years.
During the Tokugawa era, the Japanese implemented multiple reforms that
were geared towards preserving the unity of Japan. The feudalist/federalist form
of government embraced by the Tokugawa shogunate saw Japanese society
become intensely stratified with the shogunate/samurai at the top of the internal
political hierarchy followed by artisans, merchants, and peasants.34 Within this
feudalist/federalist system, about 260 regional daimyos, in exchange for swearing
fealty to the Tokugawa shogunate, were allowed to control about 75% of the
country’s land.35 Although a system with such a diffusion of authority might seem
to be fertile grounds for promoting instability, the Tokugawa era saw no major
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military conflicts within Japan throughout its 264 year duration.36 While Japanese
society was indeed based around the idea of a rigid four-class hierarchy that
venerated the samurai class, the “essential equality of each status group's function
in the political order” was recognized by the Tokugawa shogunate and the
nation’s laws were, “impartially and justly executed.”37,38
The Tokugawa shogunate were vehemently opposed to any outside
influence and effectively shut off Japanese society from the rest of the world,
especially European powers. For example, the Tokugawa shogunate instituted a
formal ban on Christianity within Japan and relegated all trading with European
nations to a single port in Nagasaki.39
The demise of the Tokugawa era was brought about by a perception
among the citizenry that the Tokugawa shogunate were incapable of resisting
domination by Western powers following the forced opening of Japan by the
United States’ Navy in 1853 by Commodore Matthew Perry, who intimidated the
Japanese into opening up their market to the United States. Once Perry’s demands
were met, other Western powers demanded the same access to the Japanese
market. The shogunate’s complying with the demands of the U.S. and other
western powers served as a radicalizing factor for young samurai and encouraged
Japan to turn towards an imperial style of rule by transforming the historically
respected, yet largely symbolic, position of Emperor into one that commanded
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absolute authority and cast away the Tokugawa era’s form of federalism-tinged
feudalism.
The Meiji Restoration (1868-1912)
Emperor Meiji’s ascendance to the throne in 1868 with the aid of the
Choshu and Satsuma feudal domains began the Meiji Era in Japanese history
which saw Japan undergo substantial political reforms and embrace aspects of
Western cultures and institutions. After the embarrassment suffered by the
Japanese following Commodore Perry’s opening of Japan to the West and the
shogunate’s signing of unequal treaties, especially in the realm of trade, with
Western powers, the Japanese were desperate to prove to the West that the
Japanese people should be viewed as equals and reverse the unequal treaties.40
The Japanese government became more highly centralized than ever
before during the Meiji era and saw the Japanese implement policies such as
universal conscription, compulsory education, and a new land tax in order to put
Japan in a better position to compete on an international level.41 As Kenneth Pyle
notes in his book, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose,
the Japanese’s desire for national unity in order to preserve Japanese autonomy
and define Japan as a major player in the international system necessitated that
“foreign policy was domestic policy,” during the Meiji era.42
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Despite the Japanese’s success in fostering nationalism within the nation,
dissent was present during the Meiji reforms, the bloodiest of which was led by
one of the Meiji Restoration’s key architects, Saigo Takamori. Takamori and the
disgruntled samurai he led were disaffected due to the Meiji government’s
dismantling of the “Tokugawa status system and its privileges, [granted to the
samurai] such as the right to bear two swords.”43 Takamori’s forces, along with
the movement to preserve the Tokugawa system, were defeated by the Meiji
government’s conscripted forces.
Similarly, the Meiji government faced pressure from a contingency of
former samurai, the peasantry, and journalists to adopt a parliamentary
democracy. This movement was known as The Popular Rights Movement, and its
members generally protested peacefully. The Meiji government ended up coopting the movement to limit its influence by offering a series of strategic
concessions to the group, the most notable of which was the creation of a
constitution.44 Despite the creation of a constitution in 1899, as well as the
establishment of a national legislature, the Imperial Diet, in 1890, “Japan
remained fundamentally undemocratic.”45 For example, the constitution,
“subordinated [individual] rights to the needs of the state,” and the right to vote
was limited to about one percent of the population, all of whom were land-owning
men.46
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Taisho Era (1912-1926)
The Taisho era was characterized by a flirtation with democracy and a
descent into totalitarianism. Before 1925, only men who had paid at least 15 yen
in property taxes were afforded the right to vote in Japan, amounting to
approximately one percent of the population. As a result of popular pressure, the
right to vote was expanded to include all men in 1925 and two major political
parties formed, the center right Minseito party and the conservative Seiyukai, the
leaders of which took turns as premier.47 Both the Minseito and Seiyukai parties
were supported by the privileged classes, such as the samurai families and big
business.48 Where the parties differed was in the fact that the Minseito were more
adamant in supporting industrial interests (one of the major supporters of the party
was the Mitsubishi family) whereas the Seiyukai party represented the interests of
the landed elite.49
Discontent with the two major parties was commonplace in the Taisho era.
Kenneth Colegrove writes in his work, “Labor Parties in Japan,” that there,
“seem[ed] to be widespread contempt for the venality of both parties” among the
commoners.50 For example, the Siemens Scandal of 1914, which involved
European companies bribing naval officials to purchase European naval
technology, resulted in violent protests in Tokyo. While the bribes were
problematic to the Japanese people, the fact that the Imperial Diet was planning
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on raising taxes to pay for the acquisition of the naval technology was the major
factor in inspiring the protests.51
Likewise, a commonly-read Japanese newspaper, Jiji Shimpo, claimed that
the old parties, “[made] a plaything of politics and treacherously [threw] dirt in
the eyes of the nation.”52 In fact, the expansion of the vote to all males gave way
to the formation of various “proletariat” parties and resulted in the election of
eight of these proletariat candidates to the Imperial Diet within the first year of
universal male suffrage.53 The practical power of these proletariat parties was
fairly limited, and there is a strong argument to be made that the conservative
nature of Japanese culture played a major role in weakening the appeal of these
proletariat parties.
Industrialization in Japan, occurring from 1890-1930, saw more people
leave the countryside for the cities and resulted in the proliferation of poor tenants
in Japanese cities who worked in textile or shipbuilding factories.54 The
movement of people into the cities from farms was spurred on by the Great
Depression, which destroyed the market for Japanese silk.55 However, the
unionization of labor, oftentimes considered a hallmark of the proliferation of
liberal/socialist movements, was unable to occur in Japan due to the lack of
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codified labor union protections under Japanese law and the routine suppression
of strikes by the Japanese police.56
For example, Colegrove mentions in his article that, “there appeare[ed] [to
be] little evidence of class-consciousness among the wage-earners of Japan.”57 In
essence, the two major parties were able to court the votes of the proletariat
parties’ presumed bases (tenants and farmers) due to the “mark[ed]
conservat[ism]” of the Japanese peasant.58 Colegrove notes that the progressive
parties of Japan, such as the Japanese Farmers’ Union, failed to win broad bases
of support despite the vote being expanded to all men and advocating for policies,
such as imposing “super-taxes” on the rich and legalizing strikes, that would
directly benefit the lower classes.59
Despite some elections of parties representing various interests,
assassinations of and assaults on political figures severely limited the ability of
democracy to flourish in Japan and national unity cabinets headed by military
members became more common than party rule.60 Likewise, the Japanese
government actively took steps to limit political discourse when it enacted the
Peace Preservation law in 1925 which criminalized advocating to change the
Emperor system.61 This law was aimed at undermining Japanese proletariat
parties (it was passed in the same year suffrage was expanded to all men), yet it
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resulted in the dogma of the state being so untouchable that parties became
moot.62 In other words, the Taisho era had some of the underpinnings of
democracy, yet the highly centralized Japanese government hindered and
eventually killed democracy in Japan during the era.
Pre-Occupation Showa Era (1926-1945)
A myriad of factors contributed to the descent into fascism that Japan
experienced during the Showa era. One major factor that permitted Japan to
pursue “aggression abroad and repression at home,” was the strength of the
Japanese military in comparison to other governmental agencies.63 Throughout
Japan’s industrialization period from about 1890 to 1930, various governmental
forces vied for the favor of the Emperor, including the parliament, the
bureaucracy, and the military.64 The military would ultimately succeed in steering
Japanese politics due to its actions abroad. For example, members of the
Kwantung Army within the Japanese Imperial Army, acting autonomously,
instigated the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 by blowing up a section of the South
Manchurian Railway near the city of Mukden and blaming it on Chinese
soldiers.65 This event, known as the Mukden Incident, was not approved by the
Imperial Diet and led to the Kwantung Army’s ensuing occupation of Manchuria
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while solidifying the Imperial Army’s grip on the country by accomplishing a feat
that could not be ignored.
Similarly, economic instability within Japan following World War I, as
well as the Great Depression, shook the faith of the Japanese in both free-market
capitalism and adversarial, democratic party systems. The early Showa era was
characterized by a transition from agricultural work to white and blue-collar jobs
by the Japanese as well as a decline in industrial output due to the conclusion of
the first World War and the Great Depression.
Likewise, as Masataka Kosaka states in his work, “The Showa Era (19261989),” “Japanese party politics became blatantly corrupt,” as politicians
practiced “unabashed pork barreling” to their constituents while simultaneously
neglecting “the welfare of society as a whole.”66 For example, funding for high
schools and colleges in elite urban centers was pushed through by the Diet
whereas no long-term plans were created to alleviate the suffering of rural
Japanese.67 The Imperial Army recruited most of its fighting force and received
most of its supplies from rural villages, and thus was “disturbed by the gap
between rural poverty and urban prosperity,” seeing the “individualism” fostered
in cities by a modernizing elite as detrimental to nationalism.68
Similarly, the changing perception of imperialism in the global arena from
accepted to unacceptable following World War I interfered with Japan’s idea of
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creating a regional hegemony in East Asia with itself at the center. The military
was summarily threatened by this change in the global tolerance of imperialism.
This was especially true considering the fact that the Japanese military had proven
itself capable of being a colonial power that could compete with the West in the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904 when Japan gained Korea as a colonial possession.
Likewise, other European powers still retained their own colonial possessions.
In other words, the liberal democratic values of the West had become, in
the Japanese’s eyes, constraints on the nation’s ability to prosper as native
supporters of Western ideals proved themselves unable to offer solutions to the
problems presented by rural poverty and changes in the international system and,
in turn, accept the consolidation of power in the hands of the military and an allpowerful Emperor in order to preserve nationalism and the Japanese’s dream of a
globally-relevant Japan.69,70
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Chapter 3: The Coercive Democratization of Japan

The United States began formulating a plan for the occupation of Japan
long before Japan had surrendered to the Allied forces in 1945. As early as 1943
the U.S. Department of State was pondering several questions concerning the
occupation of Japan including topics such as the size of the occupation force that
would be needed, the form the occupation would take, how long the occupation
would be, what the political objectives of the Military Government in occupied
Japan would be, and whether or not the Institution of the Emperor should be
retained.71
In theory, the occupation of Japan was an international affair conducted at
the behest of the Allied Powers but in practice the occupation of Japan was
administered by the United States alone.72 One man in particular, U.S. General
Douglas MacArthur, commanded extensive authority over the occupation process
due to the duality of his positions as both the Commander in Chief of the United
States Forces in the Far East Command as well as the Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers, or SCAP, which is used as both an international title for
MacArthur and a name for the “almost exclusively” American force that ended up
occupying Japan by scholars.73
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The State Department started planning for the post-war occupation of
Japan in 1943 in a document titled “Japan: General Principles Applicable to the
Post-War Settlement With Japan.” The first goal stated in the 1943 document
concerned relieving Japan of its colonial possessions of Manchuria, Korea and
Formosa. The second goal was to prevent Japan from becoming a threat to
international peace via disarming Japan.74 The third goal was to ensure that once
Japan had sufficiently satisfied the conditions of its surrender (namely embracing
democracy and dissolving its military) that the country would have equal access
to the global market.75 In other words, Japan’s economy was not to be
permanently crippled by an excessively punitive occupation or lengthy sanctions.
The fourth goal was to install a government in Japan that would respect the rights
of other states, especially in regard to state sovereignty. Lastly, the document
declares the restoration of Japan’s “full and equal membership in a family of
nations bound together by an international organization and protected by an
effective security system,” as the occupation’s ultimate goal.76 In other words, the
plan for post-war Japan was to punish the country for its transgressions while at
the same time setting the country up for success in the international community.
In a later document from 1944, these goals were integrated into three
distinct periods that provided the framework for the occupation. The first two
periods of occupation were explicitly concerned with protecting Allied (in
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particular the United States’) interests. For example, the first period was to be
harsh and focused on stripping Japan of its military capabilities and the territories
it had acquired since World War I, as well as placing Japan under “military
occupation and government.”77 Likewise, the second period of occupation largely
focused on implementing what the Department of State dubbed “measures
designed to eradicate militarism” within Japanese society.78 These measures
included establishing U.S. military bases in Japan in order to prevent Japanese
aggression and to police the populace, placing economic controls on the Japanese
economy in the name of preventing the development of “war potential,”
encouraging “democratic thought” through means such as the press, media, and
schools, and “rooting out ultra-nationalistic societies.”79 The third and final period
of occupation was left vague in the Department of State’s document, but
acknowledged the necessity of altering Japan’s political and economic structures
to compensate for the dissolution of the Japanese Empire and the resulting loss of
Japan’s dependencies.80
As would be the case almost sixty years later in Iraq, Pyle notes that,
“[m]ost of the
Americans who participated in the [o]ccupation lacked any clear understanding of
Japan’s
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history and culture.”81 In fact, one major drawback concerning the occupation of
Japan was the
fact that positions of authority went almost exclusively to general staff officers
rather than to the
nearly 2,000 highly specialized military government officers who were deployed
to Japan to help
with the occupation. In fact, many of these highly specialized personnel were
unable to penetrate
the “brass curtain” surrounding the Chief of Staff and were eventually replaced by
civilians who
were underqualified for their roles and more apt to be yes-men rather than
innovators, leaving
power concentrated in the hands of MacArthur and other military men.82
The decisions made by MacArthur had very long-term effects on both Japanese
economics and politics, as will be discussed in the following sections.
Economic Changes
Reformation of the Japanese economy was a priority for the United States
for two reasons: the idea of disarmament and preventing Japan from becoming a
leech on the American taxpayer via having a weak economy. In the years leading
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up to the United States’ occupation of Japan, the Japanese had devoted most of
the country’s industrial capacities to fueling the Japanese war machine so that
Japan could retain and gain more colonial possessions.83 The United States also
wanted to make Japan self-sufficient to a degree and therefore mandated that the
Japanese bureaucracy place controls over wages and prices so as to make the
demand feasible for the war-torn country.84
However, the United States also refrained from completely liberalizing the
Japanese economy, leaving in place many business monopolies. In prewar Japan
the banks owned by the zaibatsu groups Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and
Yasuda (Japanese conglomerates headed by powerful Japanese families that
functioned like monopolies due to their ownership of several related companies
within an industry as well as their influence in the banking industry) issued 74.9
percent of all loans in the country.85 In 1958, about 26.2 percent of loans were
issued by zaibatsu-controlled banks, meaning that a sizable portion of the
Japanese economy still was being influenced by a few strong conglomerates and
families following the United States’ occupation. The residual power of these
prewar groups in Japan is due to the fact that SCAP realized that completely
smashing the zaibatsu would remove, “the ablest and most successful leaders of
[Japan]” and therefore hinder the economic recovery of Japan and further burden
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the American taxpayer.86 In other words, despite the clear gains made in
demonopolizing Japan by the United States, Japan’s economy was still
significantly impacted by an influential few following occupation due to the
United States’ prioritization of making Japan economically viable over
completely liberalizing the Japanese economy as well as the conservative
Japanese political parties and bureaucrats affording large business interests
preferential subsidies, trade preferences, and tax regulations.87
While the decision not to dismantle the zaibatsu had the effect of
protecting the influence of a small handful of businesses and families at the
expense of the average Japanese civilian, the United States’ efforts in land
reformation significantly improved the status of many impoverished Japanese
citizens. Prior to the United States’ occupation of Japan, only one-third of the
nation’s farmers owned all of the land that they farmed.88 The other two-thirds of
farmers either completely rented their farmable land or owned some very tiny,
scattered plots and rented the rest of their land.89 The resulting impact of the land
situation in Japan was rent equaling nearly half of the gross value of farmers’
annual yields, trapping farmers in a cycle of subsistence and a low standard of
living even in years in which crop yields were good and prices were high.90
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In fact, land reform had even been on the table in Imperial Japan before
occupation due to a recognition that continued agrarian distress due to the masterservant relationship between landlords and tenants would eventually broaden the
appeal of Communism in the country.91 Similarly, the United States’ fear of a
communist Japan motivated the country to aggressively pursue land reformation
as a means to prevent the ideology from gaining traction in Japan. During
occupation, the United States made the Japanese government purchase (at cheap
prices) all of the land held by absentee tenants and most of the land of leased-out
landlords and sell it to the farmers actually tending the land.92 The U.S. also set
limits on the amount of land an individual farmer could own and the amount of
land a landlord could rent to any one farmer.93 The United States’ land
reformation policies alleviated the financial burden on farmers and significantly
combated the pervasive “agrarian discontent” which was theorized to have
significantly helped propagate Japanese aggression abroad as Japanese leaders
increasingly had to compensate for social injustice at home with glory abroad to
appease the Japanese lower class.94
Political Changes
While economic reformations imposed on Japan by the United States
during occupation certainly helped shape the future of the country, the most
significant changes to Japan came in the form of how the United States handled
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altering the Japanese political system. Political reformations that the United States
implemented in Japan simultaneously pushed the country towards democracy
while maintaining the idea that the Japanese still controlled their own destiny to a
degree. For example, one major decision that must be made when a new political
regime is created is how to handle bureaucrats and high-ranking politicians who
served in the previous regime. In the case of post-2003 Iraq, Coalition Provisional
Authority leader L. Paul Bremer’s decision to exclude members of Saddam
Hussein’s Baath Party from government employment was widely seen as a crucial
error, because it deprived large numbers of people who had joined the Baath Party
only out of a desire for self-preservation from putting their skills and knowledge
of government affairs to use in post-Saddam Iraq.
In the case of Japan, General MacArthur, acting upon orders from the
United States, chose to administer Japan indirectly through the existing Japanese
governmental apparatus, including the Japanese Emperor. In other words, the
United States did not dismantle the Japanese bureaucracy, instead opting to rule
Japan ad hoc by issuing orders to the Emperor or the Imperial Government who
were then expected to carry out SCAP’s orders. The United States did indeed
“purge the military and political elites and conducted war crimes trials” to hold
Japanese leaders accountable for their crimes against humanity during World War
II, but “left almost the entire civilian bureaucracy intact,” which ultimately
became the major power in postwar Japanese politics.95
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200,000 Japanese were initially barred from political office by MacArthur
(most of those purged were high-ranking military officials but it is important to
note that Communist Party leadership was purged too “on the grounds that they
advocated antidemocratic violence”) in 1950 in a purge dubbed, “The Removal
and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office.”96 The vast majority
of those purged under this edict were de-purged the following year by
MacArthur’s successor, General Matthew Ridgeway.97 By the time Japan was
granted independence in 1952, all of those purged under this edict had been depurged and were allowed to participate in politics once again.98 While the political
purges that occurred in Japan are seemingly light-handed, it is important to note
that as many as 6,000 Japanese were tried for brutality against Allied POWs, 900
of whom were convicted and executed.99 Similarly, notable military commanders,
such as General Homma Masahura who allowed the Bataan Death March of 1942
to occur in which thousands of American and Filipino POWs perished on an
arduous march to a prison camp, did not escape punishment and were executed.100
In other words, the most heinous offenders did indeed pay for their crimes, yet
those who indirectly participated in the war or operated at the behest of a
commander were generally spared and even reintegrated into Japanese society and
politics.

96

Peter K. Frost, “Debating the Allied Occupation of Japan (Part One),” Education About Asia 21,
no. 2 (2016), p. 60.
97
Ibid.
98
Ibid.
99
Ibid.
100
Ibid, p. 61.

43

The United States also gave the Japanese people and government ample
opportunities to govern themselves and implement directives on their own rather
than have the U.S. occupying forces control every artery of the Japanese
government from the top down.101 The United States’ occupying forces were there
primarily to ensure compliance on behalf of the Japanese if necessary, rather than
to serve as a governing apparatus.
In fact, General MacArthur found that keeping Emperor Hirohito in power
was particularly useful in transforming Japanese society. It is important to note
that prior to the United States’ occupation of their country, the vast majority of
Japanese people subscribed to the idea that the Emperor served as a “semimystical
symbol of Japan’s kokutai,” which translates to national unity.102 In fact, Japanese
officials routinely “boasted of citizens who had “risked death to save the
Emperor’s picture from destruction or even commit[ted] suicide when they
failed.”103 Similarly, the infamous suicidal kamikaze and banzai attacks the
Japanese employed during World War II were committed in the Emperor’s
name.104 In other words, the Japanese people were clearly committed to the
institution of the Emperor.
In particular, McArthur noted that Hirohito was an invaluable asset insofar
as the attainment of SCAP’s goals went. For example, MacArthur expressed
pleasure over Emperor Hirohito’s renunciation of his prior claims of religious
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superiority in the Emperor’s 1946 New Year’s speech as well as Hirohito’s
“general support of SCAP policies” and his “willingness to meet the public.”105
Due to the United States’ Senate’s desire to try Hirohito as a war criminal,
MacArthur, knowing the strategic value of having Hirohito at his disposal,
actually defended retaining the Emperor on the grounds that he would need “at
least a million” more troops to maintain the peace in Japan should Hirohito be
tried, laying the issue to rest.106
Although many Japanese bureaucrats and the Emperor were retained, that
is not to say that all of the United States’ decisions regarding the democratization
of Japan were infallible. For example, as would be the case in Iraq, “[m]ost of the
Americans who participated in the [o]ccupation lacked any clear understanding of
Japan’s history and culture.”107 In fact, one major drawback concerning the
occupation of Japan was the fact that positions of authority went almost
exclusively to general staff officers rather than to the nearly 2,000 highly
specialized military government officers who were deployed to Japan to help with
the occupation. In fact, many of these highly specialized personnel were unable to
penetrate the “brass curtain” surrounding the Chief of Staff and were eventually
replaced by civilians who were underqualified for their roles and more apt to be
yes-men rather than innovators, leaving power concentrated in the hands of
MacArthur and other military men.108
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Another key decision made in the democratization effort in Japan was
holding the first post-war election in 1946 before ultranationalists were removed
from political power (the purge occurred in 1950). This particular decision might
have been a mistake in hindsight due to the long-term impact it had on the
development of democracy in Japan since it resulted in the “reactionary old
guard’s control over the new governmental structure remain[ing] as potent as it
had been in preoccupied Japan,” especially since the existing Japanese
bureaucracy consisted of many of the same individuals who had been employed
by Imperial Japan.109 In fact, General MacArthur and the conservative generals
who served as his staff actually ended up cracking down on the burgeoning left-of
center political parties, such as the Japanese Communist Party, that sprang up
during occupation rather than on the more conservative bureaucrats due to fears
concerning the sweeping economic and political reformations that these parties
advocated for.110 SCAP actively encouraged the Japanese government to limit the
operations of these left-of-center movements by condoning placing limitations on
the press and trade unions, effectively solidifying the control that the conservative
Japanese old guard held over the country.111 For example, the Japanese press was
censored by SCAP and was prohibited from publishing articles that “interfered
with public tranquility.”112 Censored material included reporting on the effects of

109

Taylor, p. 147.
Ibid.
111
Ibid.
112
Eric Johnston, “75 Years on, Legacy of the U.S.-Led Occupation of Japan Still Resonates,” The
Japan Times, August 30, 2020, accessed April 5, 2021,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/08/30/national/us-occupation-japan-wwiianniversary/.
110

46

radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as articles containing “destructive
criticism” of the United States’ occupation.113
Perhaps the most influential decision made by the United States concerning
the occupation of Japan was the decision by the United States to impose a
constitution on the Japanese rather than have the Japanese create their own new
constitution. Due to the fact that the United States was crystal clear to the Japanese
that revising the Meiji Constitution was a matter of “prime importance” following
the Japanese’s unconditional surrender on September 2, 1945, the Japanese had
begun working on their own revisions as early as October of the same year.114 The
first effort at Japanese constitutional drafting was led by Prince Konoe, a Japanese
politician who had vehemently opposed the army’s takeover of Japan and the
entrance of Japan into war with the Anglo-American powers during the 1940s.115
Konoe’s revisions to the Meiji Constitution (as well as subsequent ones
designed by the Japanese) were thrown out by the Americans due to the inability
of Konoe and his colleagues to remedy the problems with the Meiji constitution
that arose from the document’s exaltation of the Emperor since the exaltation of
one man was deemed antithetical to democracy by the Americans. This lead
General MacArthur to settle into the mentality that “the most effective method of
instructing the Japanese Government on the nature and application of [democratic]
principles would be to prepare a model constitution embodying those principles.”116
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Part of the rationale for abandoning the hands-off approach to the revision of the
Japanese constitution was to solidify U.S. control of the occupation. Since the
occupation of Japan was technically an international ordeal on behalf of the Allied
Powers, in addition to the American-dominated SCAP, there was an international
body, the Far Eastern Committee, that formed due to British and Soviet desires to
have a bigger say in the occupation of Japan, that contended for a role in shaping
Japan’s future.117 By expediting the adoption of a constitution by the Japanese via
drafting one for them, the United States was essentially able to circumvent both the
British and the Soviets’ inputs, therefore securing near absolute control over the
direction in which Japan would democratize. The imposition of a constitution on
the Japanese, however, would cause political turmoil later on in Japan’s history,
especially the inclusion of the controversial Article 9 which relegated Japan’s
armed services to a small Self-Defense Force.
Although many of these decisions directly contributed to the continued
stability of Japan during and after occupation, one can hardly say that Japan was a
true democracy following the United States’ occupation. This is especially the
case when examining Japan’s first election during occupation in 1946. While the
political purges did result in the expulsion of many key offenders from political
office (such as the conservative Liberal Party’s, which is very closely tied to the
zaibatsu, bureaucracy, and the royal family, founder, Ichiro Hatoyama) and the
revival of prewar parties, the purges happened after the first post-war election,
meaning that the purge did not have a significant impact on the Japanese political
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sphere.118 For example, in the first postwar election in Japan that occurred in
1946, the Japanese people, despite having the option to vote for candidates across
the political spectrum from Communists to arch-nationalists and the 1946 election
having universal suffrage, expressed a “distinct preference for conservative
candidates,” i.e. many of the same people who had served in or shared the same
ideology as the Imperial Diet during World War II.119
In fact, the conservative Liberal and Progressive parties won half of the
seats in the Lower House (141 and 92 seats respectively) outright with
conservative-minded Independents and members of several conservative minor
parties capturing an additional 117 Lower House seats altogether to form a
powerful conservative coalition.120 Left-of-center political parties, such as the
Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party, won far fewer seats in the
Lower House (93 and 5 seats respectively) and were more fractured policy-wise,
crippling the strength of the liberal wing of Japanese politics.121 The electoral
tendencies of the Japanese people most likely surround the conservative parties’
desire to retain the position of Emperor and the left-of-center parties’ desire to
significantly reform, or even abolish altogether, the position.122
Even today Japan is among the most socially conservative countries and
one party, the Liberal Democratic Party (the name is misleading for the LDP is a
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right-of-center party, yet it is the spiritual successor to the Liberal Party) has
predominance in the Japanese political system where it wins most elections
despite Japan having universal suffrage.123 In fact, the longest serving Prime
Minister of Japan, Liberal Democratic Party member Shinzo Abe, exemplified the
conservative nature of Japanese politics during his second stint as Prime Minister
from 2012-2020 by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, which houses the spirits of
World War II-era Japanese war criminals.124 Likewise, Japanese history textbooks
still sanitize the war crimes that Japan committed during World War II, with one
going as far as to claim that the women that were taken advantage of in Japanesecontrolled territories during the war offered their bodies to Japanese soldiers
willingly and were not as numerous as other countries claim.125
Despite the issues with Japan’s democratization, there is no doubt that it
should be considered successful; the United States transformed a militaristic,
authoritarian society into a vibrant democracy with a strong economy. The
success of the coercive democratization of Japan is even more apparent when
viewed alongside the United States’ coercive democratization of Iraq.
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Chapter 4: Iraq Before Coercive Democratization

Pre-2003 Iraq and pre-1945 Japan are different in several significant ways.
The Japanese, for example, have had a far easier time than the Iraqis forging a
national identity due to the homogeneity of Japan. Japan’s homogeneity derives in
part from its status as an island nation, the shared ethnic and religious
backgrounds of a vast majority of Japan’s population, as well as Japan’s history of
independence rather than colonization.
In contrast, Iraq is a relatively new political unit that has existed in its
current iteration only since 1932. Iraq’s colonizers, the British, also drew Iraq’s
current borders in ways that severely disadvantaged the fledgling nation
economically and ignored the wishes of a historically autonomous people residing
within Iraq, being the Kurds. Similarly, the British privileged a minority group,
Sunni Arabs, at the expense of a Shi’a majority while creating modern-day Iraq,
continuing a trend that began under Ottoman rule of the territory.
That being said, there are various examples of Arab Sunni, Arab Shi’a,
and Kurds (the majority of which are Sunni) working together during the Ottoman
Empire’s existence. In fact, political divides within Iraq during Ottoman times
were oftentimes based on cleavages other than religion and ethnicity, such as
geography. Since pre-1932 Iraq somewhat differs from modern-day Iraq in terms
of sectarian divisions, this thesis will give careful attention to the degree to which
the policies adopted by the Ottomans, the British, post-independence governments
(such as that of Saddam Hussein), the United States occupation forces, as well as
51

the United Nations electoral commissions intentionally or inadvertently
contributed to the strengthening of sectarian divisions within Iraq, and the role
these divisions have since played in the democratization of Iraq. This chapter will
discuss these divisions prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and conclude with a
brief analysis of how sanctions also decimated the country in the decade before
the invasion.
Basic Background on Arab Sunnis, Arab Shi’a, and Kurds in Iraq
Understanding the ethnic and religious makeup of Iraq is crucial to
understanding Iraq’s complicated path towards democratization. Iraq is comprised
of three major groups: Arab Sunnis, Arab Shi’a, and Kurds, the majority of which
are Sunnis.
Arab Sunnis comprise about 20% of Iraq’s population and have largely
been the benefactors of each government that ruled Iraq from the Ottoman Empire
to Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party. An amalgamation of a perceived reversal
of Sunni progress, a decline in Sunni power, and mistreatment of Sunnis by other
groups in Iraq as well as by the United States’ military forces following the 2003
invasion of Iraq have perhaps made Sunni Arabs the group most outwardly hostile
to the creation of a democratic Iraq.
Shi’a Arabs, a group that comprises 60% of Iraq’s total population, have
historically been overshadowed in Iraqi governments by their more educated,
more influential, more unified, and less numerous Arab counterparts in Iraq, the
Sunni Arabs. Conflict between Iraqi Sunni and Shi’a groups can be traced back to
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“the competition over the leadership of the Islamic community following the
death of the Prophet Mohammed” in 632 AD.126 The Shi’a supported a hereditary
line of succession whereas the Sunni did not. Relations between the two
predominant Arab groups in Iraq have been particularly tense since the
deportation of thousands of Iraqi Shi’a by the country’s Baathist government in
the 1980s.
Lastly, the Kurds are a minority ethnic population concentrated in a
geographically distinct part of northern Iraq called Kurdistan. Kurds make up
about 20% of the population in Iraq and are the fourth-largest ethnic group in the
Middle East. Despite their prevalence in the region, Kurds have no nation of their
own, and many are located in Kurdistan in Iraq, an area that operated quasiautonomously throughout Iraq’s history and nearly fully autonomously
throughout Saddam Hussein’s control of Iraq.
Religious and Sectarian Divisions in Ottoman Iraq
The modern-day country of Iraq is a collection of several regions that
comprised part of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was a Sunnicontrolled Islamic nation that ruled between 1299 and 1922. At the height of its
power, the Ottoman Empire controlled a vast expanse of territory including parts
of northern Africa, the Balkans in eastern Europe, modern-day Turkey, and parts
of the Arabian Peninsula.
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In Ottoman times, Iraq was divided into three vilayets, or administrative
zones, being: Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra.127 These vilayets existed for centuries
and were not created along sectarian lines, yet each vilayet had significant
populations of ethnic or religious groups residing within them that influenced the
policies of the vilayets.128 Each vilayet was administered by a vali, someone who
was chosen by the Ottoman Sultan to govern a vilayet.
While the divisions within Iraq while it was part of the Ottoman Empire
were regional by nature, not sectarian, large concentrations of ethnic and religious
groups tended to be concentrated in distinct geographical regions. Kurds, for
example, had significant influence in the vilayet of Mosul due to their large
numbers in the region. Likewise, since the Ottoman Empire was a Sunni empire
that tended to only allow Sunnis to serve in government positions, Sunnis were
concentrated in the urban areas throughout the empire whereas Shi’a tended to be
located in the rural regions of Iraq.129
The governance of all three of the vilayets was influenced heavily by
prominent Arab and Kurdish families that oftentimes had strong ties to the
Ottoman Sultan.130 The vilayet of Baghdad, the spiritual successor to the Islamic
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caliphate that had fallen in 1258, primarily consisted of Sunni Muslims and was
quite loyal to the Ottoman Empire.131
The vilayet of Mosul, located in northern Iraq, was historically difficult to
administer and experienced a high turnover rate of vilas. The difficulty of
administering the Mosul vilayet has been attributed to the large Kurdish tribal
population in the region which was “well-armed, subordinate to powerful chiefs,
prone to brigandage and internecine fighting, and frequently ready to defy the
local administration.”132 The power of the Kurdish tribes forced the vilas of
Mosul to pursue a conciliatory approach to governance, resulting in the vilas of
Mosul having little real governing ability in the region.133 In essence, the Kurds
experienced quite a large degree of autonomy under Ottoman rule.134
Also notable was the administration of the modern-day state of Kuwait by
the Basra vilayet, which was majority Shi’a Muslim.135 Kuwait evaded most of
the control of the Basra vilayet (trade in the port town “flourished” mainly
because Kuwait successfully evaded the customs duties levied by Basra)
relegating the Ottoman Empire’s administration of Kuwait as purely “nominal.”136
Although the results of the Ottoman Empire’s administration of its vilayets
were varying in terms of their success, the Ottoman Empire did make great strides
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towards creating a shared Mesopotamian identity that transcended ethnic and
religious differences. For example, the Ottoman Empire had attempted to detribalize the region in order to more effectively govern it and actively pursued
policies, such as the Tanzimat reforms, that significantly decreased the influence
of tribal leaders by focusing on building a national, Ottoman identity.137 For
instance, one product of the Tanzimat reforms was the 1869 “law of Ottoman
affiliation,” which offered an incredibly flexible definition of Ottoman citizenship
and a relatively easy process of obtaining Ottoman citizenship.138 In fact, the 1869
law ensured that, “the title Ottoman is granted to any affiliated individual without
exception, regardless of his religion and sect.”139
Despite the concentrations of different religious and ethnic groups in the
different vilayets, it would be erroneous to say that the regional and ethnic
divisions that existed in Ottoman Iraq were omnipresent within Iraqi society. As
Reidar Visser notes in his work, “Other People’s Maps: An American-Inspired
Redrawing of the Iraqi Map Along Sectarian Lines Would Do Violence to the
Facts of Iraqi History,” from 1534-1914, “no secessionist attempt based on
sectarian identity ever emerged,” within Iraq and oftentimes people of the same
religion were drawn into conflict against one another due to “regional legacies”
rather than ethnic or religious differences.140 However, it is important to note that
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some commonalities between Ottoman Iraq and the deeply sectarian modern-day
Iraq do exist in both iterations of the country, namely the extraordinary power of a
minority group, the Sunnis, in Iraqi governance, the low influence of the majority
Shi’a in Iraqi governance, as well as the existence of a distinct, powerful,
geographically-concentrated population of Kurds in Iraq.
The legacy of colonialism following the fall of the Ottoman Empire was
also quite impactful on Iraq’s development. During World War I, the British,
“held no coherent view of their war aims against the Ottoman Empire, simply
wanting to defeat it.”141 Throughout the war, Britain sent letters to Palestine,
Syria, and Iraq that promised independence and British protection should they
help the Allied Powers defeat the Ottoman Empire.142
Ultimately, the borders of modern-day Iraq were established by the SykesPicot Agreement of 1916 named for its negotiators, a British man, Sir Tatton
Benvenuto Mark Sykes, and a French man, François Marie Denis Georges-Picot.
Prior to the end of World War I, Sykes and Picot were tasked by their respective
governments to divvy up the Ottoman Empire into British, French, and Russian
spheres of influence.143 The results of the treaty were the creation of the modernday states of Israel (previously Palestine), Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi
Arabia.
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The resulting borders reflected the idea that the French and British would
each obtain a sphere of influence in the Middle East, and that the two nations
would satisfy Russia by granting it influence over the Balkan states bordering the
country. The Sykes-Picot Agreement gave Great Britain influence in
Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq), the Persian Gulf, as well as the regions
bordering Palestine.144 France was granted influence over Syria and the eastern
littoral of the Mediterranean Sea, and Russia was granted influence over the
Baltic regions located between Russia’s border and the coastline of the Black
Sea.145 Little regard was given to any factors other than the interests of the victors
of World War I in the creation of new states out of the Ottoman Empire.
The Treaty of Sevres also planned to establish an independent Kurdish
state. Signed in 1920, the Treaty of Sevres was signed by the Allied Powers and
Turkey and, in Article 62, promised “local autonomy for the predominantly
Kurdish areas,” in Kurdistan, Turkey, and Syria.146 The state was only supposed
to be created if a majority of Kurds voted for it in a referendum. The referendum
was not held. In other words, the Treaty of Sevres promised the Kurds their own
country. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, replaced the Treaty of Sevres
and made no mention of an autonomous Kurdish state, much to the ire of the
Kurds.147 In other words, the idea of an independent Kurdish nation was not the
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product of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, although the independence Kurdistan
experienced under the reign of Saddam Hussein certainly invigorated Iraqi Kurds’
desire for autonomy.
Until 1932 when Iraq gained its independence, Iraq was controlled by the
British. During British control of Iraq, the country was divided into several
political districts, all of which were controlled by British political officers.148 The
British also engaged in a re-tribalization of Iraqi society that empowered “pliant”
Arab sheiks and Kurdish aghas to “be responsible for law and order” across the
country in order to make governing the country easier.149 However, instead of
making the political system stronger, the empowerment of these ethnic leaders
actually weakened the structure of the political system by creating, “cleavages and
enmities” between the newly empowered leaders.150 In other words, Iraqi ethnic
and religious tribal leaders were responsible for much of the governance of Iraq
following the demise of the Ottoman Empire, reversing the attempts of the
Ottoman Empire to de-tribalize the region.
In fact, King Faysal I, the man who the British selected to rule Iraq
following the British occupation of Iraq after World War I, ruminated on the
difficulties of fostering a national identity for the Iraqi people due to the
reemergence of strong tribal affiliations among Iraqis that transpired under British
rule. Twelve years into his rule Faysal wrote:
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There is still -and I say this with a heart full of sorrow- no Iraqi people but
unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with
religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no common tie, prone to
anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatever.151

Notably, Faysal’s observations highlight a grievance that the Ottoman
Empire had attempted to address with the Tanzimat reforms in the late 1800s.
Interestingly enough, Saddam Hussein would also later on attempt to centralize
authority in Iraq (albeit by Arab emphasizing ethnicity rather than geographic
location/residency), signifying a historical struggle on behalf of the governing
bodies of Iraq to create a common Iraqi identity that transcended ethnic and
religious cleavages.
Once World War I ended, Britain did not fulfill its promise of swift
independence to Iraq resulting in the Iraqi tribes revolting against their British
occupiers. Subscribing to the popular 19th Century theory of the white man’s
burden, Britain did not trust the Iraqi people with self-governance, instead
preferring to install young, inexperienced British military officers in advisory
roles to Arab leaders.152 The British established their own political districts within
Iraq and administered justice, maintained law and order, and tried to mediate
tribal disagreements in these districts with little input from the locals.153 For
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example, the British abolished the elected municipal councils that the Ottomans
had installed throughout Iraq.154
The degree of authority that the British commanded over the Iraqi people
was deemed intolerable by various groups within the country and prompted a
series of revolts throughout the early 1920s. Although several groups grew to
detest British control (notably the Kurds and Arab nationalists) these groups
oftentimes operated independently from one another in their insurrections, making
the revolts less effective.155 The revolts were not successful in expelling the
British from Iraq immediately, but they did serve the purpose of encouraging the
British to withdraw from the country since the cost of the war (400 men and 40
million pounds) incurred by the British during the revolts proved unpopular
among British civilians.156
Although the revolts did not result in the expulsion of the British from
Iraq, the expulsion of British forces from some cities in the southern part of the
country during the revolts offered some Iraqis an opportunity at selfgovernance.157 In the temporary absence of their occupiers, Iraqis created systems
of governance to maintain law and order as well as provide essential services such
as water rationing and health services.158 For example, in the city of Najaf Iraqis
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established their own temporary government which featured democratic principles
such as elections and a legislative body.159
The revolts also prompted the British to create Iraq’s first army, which
was comprised primarily of Ottoman-trained Sunni Arabs.160 The British also
installed Faysal I, a prominent Arab nationalist who was a descendant of the
family of the Prophet Muhammed, as the first king of Iraq. As a result of Faysal’s
identity as an Arab nationalist Sunni, Faysal’s appointment was rejected by both
the Kurds (the Kurd-heavy province of Kirkuk voted against Faysal’s ascension to
the throne in the British-sponsored legitimization election held to solidify Faysal’s
appointment) and many Shi’a yet was accepted by the Sunni-dominated army and
enough Shi’a to install Faysal as Iraq’s first king.161
Despite not gaining their independence during Britain’s occupation of
Iraq, Iraqi Kurds initially benefitted from their new occupiers as the British,
“sought to empower local Kurdish leaders and provide them with political and
administrative advice.”162 However, Kurdish favor for the British quickly
deteriorated as Kurds became increasingly aware of the lack of faith the British
held in the ability of the Kurds to govern themselves.163 British policy towards
Kurdistan autonomy became a campaign to discredit the notion that the Kurds had
the capacity to rule themselves, resulting in revolts against the British occupiers
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by the Kurds, making Kurdish nationalism “a perennial problem for successive
Iraqi governments in the decades to come.”164
It is important to note that although sectarian divisions checker Iraq’s past,
political cooperation and underpinnings of democracy are present in Iraq’s
history, the most notable of which are the existence and strength of anti-British
political parties in the 1920s and Iraq’s Communist Party. Anti-British sentiment
served as a unifying factor for ethnically and religiously diverse Iraqis that were
disaffected by Britain’s hesitation to grant Iraqis’ wish for a representative
government beholden to a legislative council free of British meddling.165
For example, in the June-October 1920 revolt against British rule in Iraq,
“Sunni and Shi’a Arabs joined forces, praying in each others' mosques and
celebrating together their respective holidays,” while Iraqi Muslims “went to the
houses of Christians and Jews” to insist that they join the protests because, “they
were Iraqi citizens like everyone else.”166 In other words, the Iraqi nationalist
movement “developed a broad political coalition encompassing members of all
Iraq's ethnic groups, including Sunni and Shi'i Arabs, Kurds, Jews, Christians,
Armenians and other minority groups,” suggesting that Iraq might not be as
incompatible with democracy as its heterogeneity would suggest.167 Likewise,
Iraq’s Communist Party also garnered significant support from all ethnic and
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religious groups in Iraq due to its emphasis on class divisions rather than ethnic or
religious divisions.168
Religions and Ethnic Divisions in Independent Iraq, 1932-2003
Once the British granted Iraq its independence in 1932, the differences in
ethnicity and religion amongst the various tribal groups in the country still
pervaded many aspects of society, and the nation grapples with these very same
challenges to this day. Iraq’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious population is
perhaps one of the greatest challenges to democratization that Iraq faces. This is
especially true considering that the three largest ethnic and religious groups, Arab
Sunnis, Arab Shi’i, and Kurds all make up a considerable portion of the nation’s
population and have very different desires in terms of what they expect from a
centralized government.
Following the British occupation of modern-day Iraq after the fall of the
Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, Sunni nationalists were chosen by the
British to rule the territory over the “reactionary Shi’i clerics,” due to
observations that, in Iraq, “Arab nationalism was spreading with an unstoppable
momentum.”169 In fact, in the post-World War I period in Iraq, “[t]he empowered
political community became almost wholly Sunni Arab, and the government was
perceived by outsiders [such as Shi’a and Kurds] to be the political embodiment
of that community.”170 This empowerment of Sunni Arabs pervaded nearly all
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aspects of government life, from high-ranking positions in the military to lucrative
positions in the nationalized oil ministry.
The Iraqi army, from its origination when Iraq was under British rule,
served as a vehicle for Sunni Arab nationalism due to it becoming the “primary
means of social mobilization and political progression in the new Iraq,” and the
prevalence of Sunni Arabs in the upper echelons of the army.171 Sunni Arabs held
a disproportionate number of officer and other high-ranking positions in the
military, and the Iraqi army was also used to brutally quash both Shi’a and
Kurdish revolts over time, intensifying the conflict between both of these groups
and the predominantly Arab Sunni government at which the Iraqi army operated
at the behest of.
The Kurds would continue to suffer under subsequent post-independence
governments. For example, the Kurds were abused by the central government of
Iraq for demanding a degree of autonomy for the Kurdish people within Iraq in
1961 when guerilla warfare between Iraq’s central government and the Kurdish
“peshmerga” ensued after Kurds demanded “linguistic and cultural rights, control
over regional security and financial affairs [in Kurdistan] and control over the city
of Kirkuk and its oil.”172 Likewise, as the American journalist George Packer
writes, Kurds were forcibly removed from their land in the 1960s. For example,
one Kurd Packer spoke to while he was in Iraq said that his family had been
forced from their home in Amshaw, a village outside of Kirkuk, by Iraqi military
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forces in 1963. The Iraqi government then razed Amshaw and redistributed the
lands surrounding the city to Arabs.173 This fate befell many predominantly
Kurdish villages throughout the 1960s.
Although the Kurds faced disappointment and discrimination before
1968, the solidification of Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party’s rule over Iraq
significantly escalated tensions between the Kurds and Iraq’s central government,
ultimately resulting in Kurdistan operating essentially as its own nation after
1991. The division between the Kurds and the Baathist government was largely
due to an ideological movement peddled by Hussein and his Baathists known
“Arabization,” which saw the Baathists systematically force ethnic minorities,
such as the Kurds, from their historic homes, such as Kirkuk, in a mass
deportation effort designed to replace non-Arabs with Arabs in areas with large
minority populations.174
For example, after 1980, the teaching of languages other than Arabic in
schools was forbidden.175 Likewise, Kurds were given the choice of “correcting,”
or becoming Arab by renouncing their culture and ethnicity in order to remain in
the city of Kirkuk.176 In 1988, chemical weapons were utilized against Kurdish
populations in Halabja and “the decimation of Kurdish villages in Iraq’s northern
mountains reached genocidal proportions.”177 In Halabja alone, about 5,000
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civilians were killed, and birth defects still pervade the local population there as a
result of the chemical weapons utilized against the Kurdish population residing in
the town, serving as a living reminder of how the Kurds suffered at the hands of
the Baathist government.178
A major motive for the ethnic cleansing of the Kurdish people at the
behest of the Baathist government was to secure the oil reserves located in
Kurdistan. Kurdistan contains within its boundaries about seven percent of Iraq’s
total oil reserves, making the region strategically important.179 Essentially, the
Baathist government wanted the region’s oil under Arab control, and Kurds were
“frozen out of government jobs,” such as ones at the state-owned Northern Oil
Company in Kirkuk, to achieve this end.180
Once he was granted control of Iraq, Hussein began cultivating a
personality cult around himself and made the idea of Arab nationalism the
epicenter of Iraqi politics. When the Baath Party rose to political prominence in
1968, Saddam Hussein initially had to share power with party leaders, yet by
1979 he had eliminated all of his political rivals within the party making Iraqi
politics, from 1980 onwards, “inexorably linked to the person of Saddam
Hussein.”181
Hussein became the “final arbiter of power, the ultimate dispenser of
justice, and the sole formulator of policy,” and aggressively pursued policies that
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served his own political needs and interests.182 For example, during the Iran-Iraq
war from 1980-1988, Hussein redefined Iraqi identity in the mold of Arab
nationalism as Iranian ayatollahs attempted to turn their co-religionist Iraqi Shi’a
neighbors against Saddam’s secular government.183 Attempting to maintain
control of the country in the face of increased violence from pro-Iranian Shi’a
groups in southern Iraq, Hussein decided to execute Iraq’s highest ranking Shi’a
cleric, Imam Baqr al-Sadr, and deport approximately 35,000 Iraqi Shi’as.184
Additionally, Saddam Hussein’s Baathist government labeled Shi’a with lucrative
business and industrial interests, “’menace[s] to the nation’” and subsequently
confiscated many of these Shi’as’ properties. 185
Saddam’s strategy to retain his grip on Iraq in the face of the Iranians’
appeals to religious divisions was to stress ethnicity. For example, in 1990
Hussein said:
The ruling clique in Iran persists in using the face of religion to foment
sedition and division among the ranks of the Arab nation… The invocation of
religion is only a mask to cover Persian racism and a buried resentment of the
Arabs.186
In other words, Hussein fused Iraqi identity with being Arab during the
Iran-Iraq war from 1980-1988.
Interestingly enough, Hussein could have appealed to an already existing
Mesopotamian-oriented identity rather than an exclusionary Arab identity in his
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attempt to combat Iranian aggression.187 In particular, appealing to the existing
Mesopotamian identity (as the Ottomans had) would have provided the benefit of
not alienating the Kurds. However, as Adeed Dawisha writes, Hussein was more
interested in appealing to Iraqi Shi’as since they constituted around 80% of the
country’s rank-and-file members of the armed forces, the majority of whom were
Arabs.188
After Kurdistan broke away from Iraq in 1991 when Iraq was firmly under
Saddam Hussein’s rule, the Kurds operated with a large degree of autonomy,
essentially acting as their own country.189 Sentiments favoring Kurdish autonomy
were bolstered further by the implementation of a no fly-zone over Kurdistan by
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in 1991 which protected the
Kurds from Saddam Hussein’s aerial attacks.190
A major point of contention between Kurdistan and the Baathist
government of Iraq revolved around control of the city of Kirkuk. While control
over the city’s oil reserves was certainly a factor in Saddam’s Arabization
campaign in Kirkuk, Packer writes that the Baathist regime’s campaign was
primarily “motivated by ideology,” noting that Kirkuk’s history and
demographics did not fit within the Baathists’ vision for the country.191
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Kirkuk has historically been an ethnically diverse city, its “layers of
successive civilizations hav[ing] nothing to do with Arab glory.”192 According to
a census conducted in 1957, Kirkuk’s ethnic makeup was 35% Kurdish, 45%
Turkoman, and only 20% Arab.193 In fact, the Arabs that Hussein imported into
Kirkuk during his Baathification campaign were distinct from the Arabs originally
residing in the city “in almost every way,” yet were favored heavily by the
Baathist government in Kirkuk.194
In essence, the story of Iraq up until the United States’ invasion of the
country in 2003 has been heavily influenced by the country’s leadership and
heterogeneity in terms of ethnicity and religion. While the country’s heterogeneity
was not always as problematic as it is today, the empowerment of a minority
group, the Sunni Arabs, by the Ottomans, the British, and Saddam Hussein’s
Baathists at the expense of a majority group, the Arab Shi’a, and an ethnic
minority group with a history of resisting subjugation, the Kurds, has resulted in
deep divisions along ethnic and religious lines within the country resulting in
severe repercussions for the democratization of modern-day Iraq.
The violence perpetuated by Saddam Hussein and his Baathists while they
were in power also had severe economic repercussions for the country that
stagnated the economic growth of Iraq and significantly reduced the quality of life
within the country. Prior to the economic sanctions placed on Iraq during the
1970s, Iraq was one of the most developed countries in the Middle East, boasting
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high attainments in terms of the Human Development Index categories of life
expectancy, education, and Gross National Income per capita/standard of living.
However, the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 by Saddam Hussein and the
Baathist government of Iraq led to the implementation of sanctions on Iraqi oil,
the resource the country’s economy relied most heavily on.195 Likewise,
Hussein’s vocalized interest in pursuing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)
programs resulted in various embargoes on chemicals and medical utensils. For
example, the international community forbade the importation of the chemical
chlorine into Iraq since it could be used in making chlorine gas.196 However,
chlorine is also frequently used for non-nefarious things, such as water
purification. Likewise, shipments of syringes were withheld from the country for
extended periods of time for fear that the Baathist government would use them to
create anthrax spores rater than administer medical treatment.197 As a result of the
sanctions imposed on Iraq following its use of chemical weapons during the Gulf
War in the early 1990s, the infant mortality rate in Iraq had risen from 3.7 percent
before the Gulf War to 12 percent by 1998, exemplifying the havoc the economic
sanctions imposed on Iraq wreaked in the country. In fact, several United Nations
agencies have estimated that the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq have
contributed to hundreds of thousands of deaths in the country.198
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That being said, it could be argued that the reverberations of the sanctions
placed on Iraq felt throughout the Iraqi economy and healthcare apparatus would
have posed a great challenge to Iraq’s democratization even if Iraq were as
homogenous as Japan. Essentially, the damage done by the sanctions alone would
be a formidable obstacle for the country to overcome on its own. That being said,
Japan also grappled with widespread poverty and faced heavy sanctions,
particularly on oil and scrap metal, prior to World War II yet was able to
overcome these economic obstacles and democratize during the United States’
occupation of the country.
Although the sanctions Iraq faced in the 1990s following the Gulf War
severely altered the course of Iraq’s modernization for the worse, the cleavages
amongst the three predominant ethnic and religious groups in Iraq certainly pose a
unique challenge to democratization that was not present in the case of Japan,
especially considering how subsequent Iraqi governments have, to varying
degrees, picked the winners and losers in terms of Iraqi politics.
For example, Sunni villages prospered under the rule of Saddam Hussein,
“when local men filled the ranks of the Baathist government,” leading to a
residual loyalty to Saddam and his movement among the Sunni population.199 The
remaining Sunni nostalgia for Saddam’s rule that pervaded Sunni communities in
modern-day Iraq largely stems from the Sunnis’, “apprehension and anxiety over
the fate of a minority (Sunnis) that, by virtue of its wealth, its education, and the
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favoritism of overlords, had ruled Iraq for centuries, through colonialism and
coups, dictatorship and war.”200 In other words, following Saddam’s fall, the
Sunni population found itself in a very vulnerable, far less powerful position than
the minority had grown accustomed to throughout Iraq’s history.
Likewise, since the Ottoman Empire was a Sunni empire, Shi’a rarely held
positions of power within the empire despite comprising a majority of the
population. This trend continued after the fall of the Ottoman Empire as well
since the British further empowered the minority Sunni population with positions
in the new Iraqi government. For example, despite Shi’a Arabs comprising a
majority of Iraq’s population, the British chose Faysal I, a Sunni Arab nationalist,
as the country’s first king.
Religious and political authority amongst Shi’a typically “devolved” to
scholars of religion, known as ulema, who acted as, “reference figures for how
Shi’i should live their lives,” some of which garnered significant followings.201
The diffusion of religious authority amongst several influential ulema has
politically fragmented Shi’a in Iraq, for each grouping of Shi’a has its own
traditions and teachings, contributing to the dilution of Shi’a power in Iraq as the
majority religious group grapples with intra-group differences.
Gareth Stansfield, a professor at the University of Exeter who specializes
in Middle Eastern studies, also writes about five major historical issues that
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helped form an, “agitated Shi’i community,” in Iraq.202 Historically speaking, the
division between Sunni and Shi’a transcends religion and pervades the political
realm. For example, the Ottoman Empire’s empowerment of Sunni groups during
Ottoman rule of Iraq began the transformation of the Sunnis from a religious
minority to “the designated ruling class.”203 That being said, the first issue that
fostered Shi’a dissatisfaction is the idea that Shi’a have been historically
underrepresented in Iraqi governance. The Shi’a perceive the identity of Iraq to be
a Sunni-driven identity “constructed around Arab nationalism and secularism,”
whereas the Shi’a would rather the identity of Iraq be driven by spirituality.204
The second issue is broadly economic and focuses on land reforms that
targeted influential Shi’a. For example, Saddam Hussein’s Baathist government
labeled Shi’a with lucrative business and industrial interests, “’menace[s] to the
nation’” and subsequently confiscated many of these Shi’a’s properties. 205
Likewise, the Baathist government deported many of the Shi’a from whom they
took land from to Iran in the 1980s.206
The third issue is cultural in nature and has to do with the prevalence of
secular Arab nationalism over Islam as the driving political force in Iraq. Shi’a are
particularly bothered by the, “association of Arab and Iraqi nationalism with the
glories of past empires,” which Shi’a believe undermines “the essence of Shi’i
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Islam with its legitimacy coming from the veneration of the family of Imam
Ali.”207
The fourth issue concerns the rights of citizens. The major problem in this
regard is the Iraqi government equating Shi’ism with “Iranian encroachment into
Iraq’s affairs,” due to regional and religious ties between Shi’a communities and
Iran, particularly in the southern part of Iraq.208
The fifth issue is secularization. Modernization in Iraq lead to a takeover
in responsibilities by the state from religious authorities, including the
administration of justice, education, and taxation. As a result, the decline of the
“vast financial networks” centered around different religious authorities and
shrines in the Shi’a community crippled the influential religious class and
“weakened their position” in the country considerably.209
Despite numerically being a majority in Iraq, the Shi’a, “have traditionally
been grossly under-represented within the organs of [the Iraqi] state,” and have,
“been viewed with suspicion by successive Arab and Iraqi nationalist
governments,” due to the dominance of the Shi’a in neighboring Iran.210 In fact,
Each Iraqi government has viewed Iraqi Shi’a as being influenced by Shi’a in
Iran, and has thus discriminated against the Shi’a for fear of Iran playing a major
role in Iraqi politics by using the Iraqi Shi’a population to its advantage,
presenting further obstacles to the democratization of Iraq.
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The Kurds have been similarly marginalized by subsequent Iraqi
governments and have historically operated with a large degree of autonomy
under each government Iraq has had since the Ottoman Empire. The geographic
concentration of the Kurds in Kurdistan as well as a historic Kurdish desire for an
autonomous Kurdish country have been reoccurring issues that each Iraqi
government has had to reckon with. Oftentimes, Iraqi governments have utilized
violence against the Kurds in order to subjugate them, culminating in the use of
chemical weapons against Kurdish populations under Saddam Hussein’s rule of
the country. Similarly, Hussein’s Arabization campaign sought to ethnically
cleanse Iraq of non-Arab cultures and the Kurds felt the brunt of the campaign as
Kurdish people lost their homes and saw their language and culture purged from
Iraqi society. After massive chemical weapons attacks by the government on the
Kurds in 1991, the U.S.-and U.K. imposed no-fly zone over the Kurdish areas
which continued until 2003 allowed Kurdistan to become for all intents and
purposes fully autonomous from Baghdad.
In conclusion, the sanctions that Iraq faced during the 1970s stymied the
modernization of Iraq to a degree that crippled the country for decades and
significantly disadvantaged Iraq in terms of democratization. Similarly, the
policies pursued by subsequent Iraqi governments laid the groundwork for the
deep sectarian divisions that pervade modern-day Iraqi society, exacerbating the
already difficult endeavor of democratizing a heterogenous society.
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Chapter 5: The Coercive Democratization of Iraq
Decisions Made by the United States Before Intervening
In this chapter, I will examine some of the key decisions affecting Iraq in
the first three years of the United States’ coercive democratization attempt,
including: the United States’ decision to reject the “Future of Iraq Project,” the
inadequate number of U.S. troops sent to occupy Iraq, the decision to dissolve the
Iraqi army, the de-Baathification of the Iraqi government, as well as the election
system implemented in Iraq by the United States.
Decision to Disregard the Findings of the Future of Iraq Project
The United States government did have a plan to address the obvious
problems that were likely to arise from a coercive democratization of Iraq. A
Department of State document called “The Future of Iraq Project” gave clear
indications that the issues of religion and ethnicity would be at the forefront of
any democratization effort. “The Future of Iraq Project” (FOI) was a State
Department document written in 2002 by working groups consisting of Iraqi
diaspora and U.S. experts that sought to formulate a plan for the democratization
of Iraq following the ousting of Saddam Hussein. Two questions included in the
document are, “Should the new Iraqi constitution make Islam the official state
religion or should religion and state be separate?”
The document proposed adopting a federal system which would serve “the
rights of nationalities… through local government and via resource sharing with
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the regions [of Iraq].”211 The Democratic Principles Working Group came up with
a few different “visions about federalism and the future of Iraq,” being the ideas
of implementing either nationally based federalism that emphasized divvying up
Iraq into regions that reflect ethnic makeup, and territorially based federalism.
which emphasized not ethnicity but a combination of, “geography, population
harmony, and tradition.”212
Both a two region and multi region variant were discussed. In the version
in which Iraq would be divided into only two regions, only the Arabs and Kurds
would have received designated regions, whereas in the multi region version
Turkmen and Assyrian populations would also have received distinct geographic
areas to exercise control over. The authors argued that the two region variant of
nationally based federalism would have allowed Arabs and Kurds to “fully
realize” their own aspirations in their respective regions, yet it would have been
extraordinarily difficult, or even impossible, to place areas or cities, such as
Kirkuk, that have “no dominant national group” within either group’s territory
without igniting tensions.213 One key benefit of the multi-region form of
federalism was that it would ensure that smaller ethnic minorities such as the
Assyrian and Turkmen populations, which constitute less than one percent and
less than two percent of the Iraqi population respectively, would be afforded the
ability to exercise self-rule, yet it ran the risk of creating low population
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geographic areas that might fail to be “economically viable” on their own, (FOI,
pg. 124).214
Finally, there was the territorially based federalism plan. The benefit of
such a plan was that it would not divide the country along ethnic lines and would
therefore “encourage tolerance and integration,” potentially leading future
generations to be “less driven by national and religious pride.”215 However, this
plan was weak in the sense that the territorial regions would be filled with too
diverse a population that would have the potential of leaving each group equally
unsatisfied as the regional government failed to address the cultural needs of each
group.216 A five region federal structure was ultimately the plan that the
Democratic Principles Working Group decided upon as the best course of action
for Iraq, noting that under this plan, ethnicities would not be the primary reason
for geographic divisions since many districts would have a mixed population and
that each region would be large enough to be economically viable, yet small
enough so that the people could hold the regional governments accountable.217
Ultimately, the FOI was discarded by the United States. Ambassador
Barbara Bodine, the Coordinator for the Central Region of Iraq under the Office
for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), says that internal
Washington politics resulted in the project being completely scrapped.218 Bodine
says that then-Vice President Dick Cheney and then-Secretary of State Donald
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Rumsfeld were uninterested in the long-term democratization option offered by
the Future of Iraq Project and preferred a short-term operation that would create a
pro-U.S. government led by the expatriate Iraqi politician Ahmed Chalibi.219 In
fact, Bodine says that anybody who was associated with the Future of Iraq Project
was forbidden from taking part in the occupation of Iraq.220
Size of the U.S. Occupation Force
A second key decision prior to the invasion that affected its success
dramatically was the level of U.S. troops with which to invade the country, which
most military officials outside the political appointees in the Pentagon, and many
scholars, argued was severely inadequate.
The initial U.S. force in Iraq was 150,000 soldiers.221 Larry Diamond, an
American scholar of democracy who served in the Coalition Provisional
Authority in 2004 at the invitation of then-Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice,
cites a study by the RAND Corporation in his book on the U.S.’ occupation of
Iraq, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to
Bring Democracy to Iraq, that argued that, “[t]here appears to be an inverse
correlation between the size of the stabilization force and the level of risk [in a
nation-building situation]. The higher the proportion of stabilizing troops, the
lower the number of casualties suffered and inflicted.”222
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Diamond notes that using the RAND Corporation’s 1 to 50 international
soldiers to inhabitants figure from its study of the successful occupations of
Bosnia and Kosovo would have required the U.S. to have deployed a force of
“nearly half a million troops.”223 As one of Diamond’s anonymous sources told
him:
[t]he inadequacy of force and of resources meant that we could not secure
the roads, we could not protect the courageous Iraqis who were coming to work
with us, and ultimately we could not protect our own people.”224 The United
States also lacked sufficient troops to secure Iraq’s border and hunt down the
remnants of Saddam Hussein’s force, opening the country up to insurgency and
violence.225
Diamond’s report of insufficient troop levels is not isolated. In fact,
Ambassador Barbara Bodine, both in an interview I conducted and in the
documentary on the United States coercive democratization attempt in Iraq, “No
End In Sight,” lamented the lack of troops devoted by the United States to the
occupation effort, citing insufficient troop levels as a major reason that the
coercive democratization of Iraq failed since, as a result of L. Paul Bremer’s
decision to disband the Iraqi military, there was no existing policing apparatus
that could crack down on looters and keep the Iraqi streets safe.226 In the absence
of the Iraqi army and sufficient numbers of American military personnel, Iraq was
left essentially defenseless from crime.
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Why were so few troops used? Diamond suggests that deploying a force
equal to the size of the RAND Corporation’s figure would have “necessitated an
immediate mobilization of the military reserves and National Guard… [which]
might have alarmed the [American] public into questioning the costs and
feasibility of the entire occupation.”227 In other words, deploying a larger
occupation force would have been a politically unpopular move for American
leaders to take, granting credence to De Mesquita and Downs’ theory concerning
the intentions of a democratizing leader and the outcome of occupations.
Another reason why the United States’ occupation force was relatively
small was the plan that the United States had for the governance of Iraqi after the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The Bush Administration relied heavily on a man
named Ahkmed Chalibi, the president of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a
generally pro-invasion, anti-Saddam Hussein group consisting almost entirely of
Iraqi exiles that had the ability to meet in the autonomous zone of Kurdistan or
outside of Iraq. This reliance of Chalibi’s predictions occurred despite the United
States’ Intelligence Committee finding the data of the INC very unreliable in its
planning for the occupation of Iraq. The Bush Administration was enticed by
Chalibi’s claim that post-war Iraq would be pro-American. Thus, the Bush
Administration formulated a plan to occupy Iraq for a mere three-four months and
install a government made up of Iraqi exiles led by Chalibi and planned for a
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“drastic reduction of troops” in Iraq following the installation of said
government.”228 Likewise, ORHA was only provided with 120 staff.229
In a similar vein, the Bush Administration did not create ORHA until 60
days before the invasion. ORHA was severely underfunded, with its offices
lacking basic equipment, such as computers, and adequate staff and support
personnel. These issues, alongside a lack of interpreters and protective equipment,
persisted once the ORHA members and American forces arrived in Iraq.230
Civilians who did arrive were often unqualified for the tasks to which they
were assigned. Diamond notes that a twenty-four-year-old Yale graduate was
tasked with reorganizing the Baghdad stock exchange and a Harvard graduate in
his twenties was one of the people who helped negotiate the country’s new
constitution.231
Decision to Disband the Iraqi Army
In the first few months of the occupation, ORHA, under the leadership of
Jay M. Garner, a retired general who had led Operation Provide Comfort (an
operation aiming to assist the Kurds during the Gulf War in 1991), severely
miscalculated how long democratizing Iraq would take. In fact, Garner was under
the impression that he could assemble an interim Iraqi authority in just three
months. After Garner’s tenure as the head of ORHA, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer
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took charge of the Iraqi occupation effort as the head of the newly formed
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and proceeded to make a series of
decisions that had disastrous impacts on the coercive democratization of Iraq.
While the U.S. invaded Iraq with what most observers argue was a grossly
inadequate number of troops, the resulting difficulty was greatly compounded by
the CPA’s decision in the first months after Saddam’s removal to disband the
Iraqi army. Critics of this decision point to the proliferation of roving militia
groups, many of which were constituted from the newly unemployed members of
the Iraqi Army as well as the inability of the American forces to effectively police
post-invasion Iraq due to a severe lack in numbers and equipment.
The decision to dissolve the Iraqi army was made by L. Paul Bremer and
was issued on May 15, 2003, and cost 450,000 Iraqi soldiers their jobs.233 L. Paul
Bremer defended his decision by stating that by the time Baghdad had fallen on
April 9, of 2003, the “Iraqi Army had simply dissolved,” citing the words of
General John Abizaid, who served as Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Forces
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Abizaid had said, in a video briefing American
officials about the situation in Iraq, that, “there [were] no organized Iraqi military
units left,” after Hussein’s fall leaving the United States with the options of either
trying to recall the old army or to build a new one out of “vetted members of the
old army and new recruits.”234
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Bremer argues that he had no choice but to dissolve the army due to what he
called “the practical impossibility” of recalling the original Iraqi Army because
looting had left the country’s army bases unusable.235 Likewise, Bremer argued
that the ethnic makeup of the original army’s draftees and commanders would
have made retaining the Iraqi army unrealistic, suggesting that the Shi’a draftees
would not have responded to a recall order from their primarily Sunni
commanding officers.236 Finally, Bremer argues that the political and symbolic
ramifications of reinstating an army that would be, according to Bremer, a
reminder of Hussein’s “Baathist-led Sunni ascendency,” to the Iraqi public made
dissolving the Iraqi army necessary for the democratization of Iraq to be
successful.237 Bremer also mentions that the plan to create a new army open to
new recruits as well as old army members was approved and edited by not only
one individual, but by many high-ranking officials in the U.S. and British
governments. In fact, according to Bremer, aside from a few “minor edits” not a
single “military or civilian official raised objections to the proposal to create a
new Iraqi army or to formally dissolve Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus.”238
Bremer argues that he did not make this momentous decision alone, and that the
decision “was carefully considered by top civilian and military members of the
American government,” and claims that dissolving the army was, “the right
decision.”239 Many serving military officers and journalists’ accounts of Bremer’s
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decision making and reasoning directly contradict Bremer. Diamond notes that
U.S. Army officers predicted that it would create a “security vacuum, humiliate a
strategic, well-armed segment of society, and thereby stimulate a violent
backlash.”243
Similarly, New York Times reporter Michael R. Gordon also writes that it
was indeed Bremer who had made the call to dissolve the Iraqi Army “revers[ing]
an earlier plan,” that “would have relied on the Iraqi military to help secure and
rebuild the country and had been approved at a White House meeting that Mr.
[George W.] Bush convened just 10 weeks earlier.”249 Gordon alleges that despite
President Bush ultimately endorsing Bremer’s plan, Bremer circumvented the
secretary of state, Colin Powell, and the senior American commander in Iraq, Lt.
Gen. David McKiernan, during the formulation of the plan, “prompt[ing] bitter
infighting within the government and the military, with recriminations continuing
to this day [March 2008].”250 The original plan, according to Gordon, was to use
the existing Iraqi military apparatuses to “help protect the country” and serve as
“a national reconstruction force.”251 Only the Republican Guard units, the units
most deeply loyal to Hussein, were supposed to be “disarmed, detained and
dismantled” under the original plan.252 Part of the logic in retaining a large
number of the soldiers in the Iraqi Army was to prevent putting 250,000-300,000
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soldiers out of work and on the streets where they might turn to crime to provide
for themselves and their families.253
A hiccup in this plan was the desertion of many Iraqi soldiers after the
ousting of Saddam Hussein, and therein lay the conflict between the highestranking American civilian official in Iraq, Bremer, and his military counterpart,
McKiernan. Bremer saw the desertion of Iraqi soldiers as proof that the old
military had disbanded, whereas McKiernan believed that the Iraqi army could be
reestablished if soldiers and some generals and senior officers were officially
recalled.254 McKiernan’s plan was to put the Iraqis who responded to the recall on
a roster and “sort out the bad guys as [they] went.”255 General Abizaid echoed
McKiernan’s sentiments, adding that, “Arab armies were traditionally large to
keep angry young men off the street and under the supervision of the
government.”256 Given the loss of income and Abizaid’s statements, it is easy to
see how young, unemployed men who had formerly been receiving compensation
and military training in the old Iraqi army, might have turned to looting and
insurgency to compensate for their loss of income and pride.
The Future of Iraq project had argued against dissolving the Iraqi army,
suggesting instead that its members be trained in human rights and international
law.257 Larry Diamond considers the dissolution of the Iraqi army one of
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Bremer’s “fateful decisions that collectively put the United States down a
treacherous path.”258
The large numbers of Sunnis in the army meant that perhaps the most
important long-term repercussion of dissolving the army was turning this segment
of the population against the U.S. and the Iraqi government, leading directly to the
rise of the insurgency and support for al-Qaeda in Iraq.
Decision Not to Stop the Looting
Upon the arrival of United States forces in Iraq and the subsequent ousting
of Hussein, chaos ensued. Looting was rampant, the cost of which was around 12
billion dollars, or roughly equivalent to the revenue of Iraq during the 2003-2004
fiscal year and was not limited to small items.261 Looters would engage in
activities such as destroying concrete walls with heavy-duty excavation
equipment in order to take the rebar from within them, emphasizing how
problematic the looting issue was.262 Insurgent groups also proliferated as a lack
of policing of looting and violence persisted and as mass arrests occurred which
oftentimes removed a breadwinner from a family on the basis of his being a
military-aged man.263
U.S. forces were not ordered to intervene to prevent the looting, another
decision which many see as a key mistake in the early months of the war by high-
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ranking officials such as Ambassador Barbara Bodine, the CPA’s Coordinator for
the Central Region of Iraq.264 Soldiers were directly ordered not to interfere with
the looting, even though the Fourth Geneva Convention made intervening in
stopping the looting permissible under international law. In Ambassador Barbara
Bodine’s words, the lack of response to the looting showed that “liberation really
didn’t have anything to do with the average Iraqi,” leading the Iraqi people to turn
against the Americans.266 Bodine also mentions that ORHA had identified 20 sites
that needed to be protected, including important historical, cultural, religious, and
artistic sites, as well as the oil ministry. Out of those sites, only the oil ministry
was protected, leading to a prevailing thought amongst the Iraqi people that
America was only interested in Iraq for its oil.267 Ambassador Peter Galbraith
noted that “unchecked looting effectively gutted every important institution in the
city- with the notable exception of the oil ministry.”268 The occupation effort
projected the image that it was prioritizing protecting Iraq’s oil over the very
people the forces were there to help, which bolstered the idea that the United
States was uninterested in the long-term health of Iraq’s new democracy.
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Decision to Pursue Extensive De-Baathification
The de-Baathification order, also issued at the behest of L. Paul Bremer on
May 15, 2003, severely weakened the United States’ occupation effort in Iraq.
Bremer’s order saw as many as 50,000 Baath party members expelled from
government employment, but in reality, it is likely many more individuals were
impacted by this decision.269
The purge of the Baath Party might have been one of the most telling
reasons for the failure of the U.S. occupation of Iraq because it removed not only
most of the Iraqi army, but tens of thousands of highly educated professionals
from serving society as well. As Diamond quotes an anonymous source saying,
“the Baath Party was the state, and when you dissolve the party you dissolve the
state. You deprive yourself [the occupier] of the whole state. You deprive kids of
teachers, people of doctors. You deprive the country of engineers who could fix
the infrastructure.”271
By removing members of the Baath Party from influential roles
completely, the existing apparatus of the state essentially ceased to exist, leaving
the United States with the task of guiding a country through democratization with
only itself to shoulder the burden. Both the dissolution of the army and the
removal of Baathists from these positions helped to cement the idea that the
United States was an occupier, not a liberator. Had the United States followed the
Freedom of Iraq Project’s guidance, instead of purging the entire Baath Party
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from political life, only high and mid-level perpetrators of war crimes would have
been held accountable. Following this guidance could have potentially remedied
some of the resulting downsides of getting rid of the vast majority of educated,
trained state officials, such as shortages of teachers and engineers, state actors
who would have been crucial to rebuilding and democratizing Iraq.
Signs of Increasing Sectarian Violence
As the blunders on behalf of the U.S. occupation force began to
accumulate causing looting to spread and an anti-American insurgency to take
hold, signs of increasing violence around sectarian divisions began to emerge.
Kurdish Resentment Over Past Injustices
One of the most defining features of Saddam Hussein’s regime was his
genocide against Iraq’s Kurdish population. Although previous Iraqi governments
had displaced Kurdish populations in Iraq prior to Hussein and his Baathist
government, Hussein significantly escalated violence against the Kurds due to a
policy he aggressively pursued known as “Arabization.” Arabization campaigns
were utilized by Hussein to consolidate oil resources in Kurdistan, the northern
region of Iraq that has historically been the homeland of Iraqi Kurds.272
Hussein’s Arabization campaigns included a genocide against the Kurds.
The Anfal Campaign, carried out by Hussein’s cousin “Chemical” Ali Hussein alMajid in 1988, saw as many as 4,000 Kurdish villages and towns destroyed and
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resulted in the disappearance of some 100,000 Kurds, many of whom had
chemical weapons utilized against them.273
Later on, in 1991, Hussein and his Baathist government displaced 120,000
Kurds from Kirkuk, an oil-rich city in northern Iraq that had historically had a
sizeable Kurdish population, replacing them with Arabs in an attempt to create an
Arab majority in the city.274
The resentment Iraq’s Kurdish population fostered concerning the Anfal
Campaign and the Arabization of Kirkuk would prove to be a major obstacle for
U.S. occupation forces to surmount. For example, once Baathist officials had been
driven out of Kirkut in the wake of the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, Kurds
began chasing Arabs out of their former homes and squatting in houses left
behind by fleeing Baathists. American soldiers, like Jordan Becker in the article
by Packer, approached these squatters and essentially told them that they needed
to vacate in order to create stability in the nation, rather than seek immediate
rectifications for past wrongs.275 According to Packer, the Kurds were initially
accepting of the Americans’ logic due to their image as liberators from an
oppressive regime.276
However, this sentiment quickly faded as acceptable state apparatuses for
assessing claims by Kurds over lost land and possessions failed to appear in a
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timely fashion.277 The tables quickly turned as Kurdish militant groups displaced
Arabs who were given homes by the Baathists that were originally in Kurdish
hands, making one disgruntled Arab note that the Kurds were displacing more
Arabs than necessary in their reclamations. Packer notes that the Arab man
remarked that, “the number of Kurdish families who had taken over Amshaw was
just half the number of Arabs who had fled—there were enough houses in
Amshaw for twenty-five Arab families to return and live together with the
Kurds,” making it clear that the Kurds are not completely blameless in the
ensuing struggle for peace in Iraq.278
Sunni Grievances & the Rise of the Insurgency
The Kurds were not the only group of Iraqis that harbored resentment
following the 2003 invasion. The Iraqi army, from its origination when Iraq was
under British rule, served as a vehicle for Sunni Arab nationalism due to it
becoming the “primary means of social mobilization and political progression in
the new Iraq,” and the prevalence of Sunni Arabs in the army.279 Most
importantly, Sunni Arabs held a disproportionate number of officer and other
high-ranking positions in the military. The Iraqi army was also used to brutally
quash both Shi’a and Kurdish revolts over time, intensifying the conflict between
both of these groups and the predominantly Arab Sunni government which the
Iraqi Army operated at the behest of.
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Resistance from the Sunni population in Iraq against American forces
increased as the U.S. military began to actively hunt for Sunni insurgents, such as
was the case in “Operation Peninsula Strike,” a 2003 military venture into the
Sunni Triangle (an area consisting of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates
Rivers that ranged from the borders of Iran and Syria to central Iraq) to root out
insurgents.
As Anthony Shadid writes in his book, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People
in the Shadow of America’s War, the raids on Sunni villages conducted during
Operation Peninsula Strike, “ignited myriad grievances in [Sunni] villages like
Thuluyah, molding a tableau of confusion, fear, and vengeance,” within the Sunni
population in Iraq as more and more Sunnis became collateral damage.280
According to Shadid, many of the Sunni villages American forces raided had
prospered under the rule of Saddam Hussein, “when local men filled the ranks of
the Baathist government,” leading to a residual loyalty to Saddam and his
movement among the Sunni population. This remaining Sunni nostalgia for
Saddam’s rule largely stemmed from the Sunnis’, “apprehension and anxiety over
the fate of a minority (Sunnis) that, by virtue of its wealth, its education, and the
favoritism of overlords, had ruled Iraq for centuries, through colonialism and
coups, dictatorship and war.”281 In other words, following Saddam’s fall, the
Sunni population found itself in a very vulnerable, far less powerful position than
the minority had grown accustomed to.
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American raids on Sunni villages following increases in ambushes and hitand-run attacks on American forces in the Sunni Triangle, “a region that the U.S.
military, early on, had identified as a bastion of support for the fallen
government,” heightened tensions between the American occupation forces and
Sunni citizens as raids began to result in the deaths and injuring of innocent
people, including children. In Thuluyah, for example, one 15-year-old boy was
shot in the arm during the raid, a mentally challenged 19-year-old was beaten by
American forces for panicking when soldiers taped his mouth shut, and another
15-year-old boy was shot and killed outright.282
Likewise, American soldiers rounded up Sunni villagers in Thululyah
indiscriminately and brought them to detention centers for questioning. According
to Shadid, out of the approximately four hundred residents of the town who were
arrested, “all but fifty” were released in the days following the raid.283 The mass
roundups of Sunni villagers began to instill in Sunni villagers a sense that the
United States was administrating collective punishment on Sunnis for simply
sharing a religion with Saddam, a sentiment that would serve as a radicalizing
factor for many Sunnis who had initially, “joined the [Baath] party more for its
patronage than its politics.”284
The Iraqi city of Fallujah, a city that has a very large Sunni population,
was also decimated by American forces in March 2004 when the city was
occupied by American soldiers after four American Blackwater (a private military
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contractor the United States hired to assist in the Iraqi occupation) mercenary
soldiers were killed in the city by insurgents. Over 600 Iraqis, many of whom
were women and children, perished during the ten days of fighting that ensued
between U.S. forces in the city and insurgents.285 During the standoff, the United
States called in multiple air strikes, which further alienated the Sunni population
as they saw their city get destroyed and their friends and families become
collateral damage.286 The violence in Fallujah greatly contributed to Sunni
hesitancy to participate in the first Iraqi elections.
Elections and Sectarianism in Post-Invasion Iraq
The elections to create the Iraqi parliament as well as to approve the
country’s constitution, held in January and December respectively, would prove
to be highly divisive and sectarianized.
After the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003, one of the major goals of
the Coalition Provisional Authority was to determine an electoral system that
would provide Iraq with a Transitional National Assembly.287 The Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) considered multiple forms of electoral systems,
including a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, multiple proportional representation
(PR) systems, an alternative vote (AV) system, and a single nontransferable vote
(SNTV) system for Iraq.288
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Some systems were removed from contention rather quickly due to the
existing realities of post-invasion Iraq. For example, the FPTP system was
dismissed due to the heterogeneity of Iraq. Although a FPTP system would have
curbed the prevalence of autocratic and radical groups in the Iraqi political sphere,
a winner-take-all electoral system would also have severely disadvantaged
minority groups, such as the Sunnis. Similarly, the idea of implementing an AV
system, which requires voters to rank candidates on a ballot, was thrown out
quickly. Although an AV system is desirable since it forces candidates to strive to
be not only a voter’s first choice, but also a voter’s second and third choice,
therefore encouraging the adoption of politically moderate stances by candidates,
the CPA recognized that Iraq simply did not have the resources to do the
laborious tasks of tallying, districting, and recounting that an AV system demands
of a governing body.289 Similarly, the CPA wanted to keep voting simple for the
Iraqi people, many of whom had not participated in a democratic election for
several decades.290
Ultimately, a proportional representation system was deemed most
appropriate for Iraq, mainly due to the system’s promotion of power sharing. The
system was also the fairest, since in a proportional representation system the
government would (in theory) reflect the makeup of the population.291 That being
said, the proportional representation system put an historically powerful minority
group, the Sunni Arabs, at a significant disadvantage vis a vis the Kurds (whom
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Sunni Arab governments had oppressed and whom had been essentially acting
autonomously for over a decade) and the Shi’a (whom had been perennially
underrepresented in Iraqi governments as well as subjected to discriminatory
policies such as deportation by Sunni Arab governments).292 Kurdish and Shi’a
leaders also strongly encouraged their people to vote under this new system.293
In other words, while the Kurds and Shi’a were enthusiastic about utilizing
a proportional representation system in Iraqi elections since it significantly
expanded their clout in the country’s governance, it is important to note that Sunni
Arabs had much to lose from this particular electoral system due to Sunni Arab
domination in preceding Iraqi governments. This was especially so given the
blatantly sectarian rule of Saddam Hussein. In fact, the way in which the CPA set
up Iraq’s PR system (utilizing PR in a single nationwide district rather than in
multiple districts and not including a minimum floor of representation for
geographic areas) resulted in the January 2005 elections being, “almost purely a
national-identity referendum,” and the majority of Sunni political parties
boycotting the elections.295
Sunnis were also berated by radical Sunni and Baathist insurgent groups,
such as al-Qaeda, throughout Iraq’s first election. In fact, al-Qaeda threatened to
retaliate against Sunnis who participated in the election, significantly decreasing
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voter turnout in Sunni-dense governorates.296 For example, in the Sunni-majority
governates of Anbar, Salahaddin, Ninewa, and Diyala, voter turnout was
respectively only 2.42, 29.25, 16.96, and 33.09 percent of the governates’ total
eligible voting populations in Iraq’s first election.297 Non-coincidentally, these
governorates also happened to be where the majority of violence occurred in
Iraq.298 For example, 47 percent of the 8,799 attacks that happened in Iraq from
April 2004-December 2005 occurred in Sunni-majority governorates.299 In
contrast, 5 percent of the attacks occurred in Shi’a-majority governorates and only
.06 percent of the attacks occurred in Kurd-majority governorates in Iraq within
the same time period.300 Shaheen Mozaffar’s tables from his work, “Elections,
Violence and Democracy in Iraq,” help to show these discrepancies.301
Fascinatingly, Shi’a-majority governorates generally experienced lower voter
turnout rates than Kurdish-majority governorates, suggesting that there is a
correlation between a population’s experience with violence and voter turnout
rates.302
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The violence experienced by Sunni politicians who attempted to
participate in Iraq’s first election is displayed in the documentary My Country, My
Country, which follows a Sunni physician, Riyadh al-Adhadh, who decided to run
for office in Iraq’s first election, despite other Sunnis feeling as though the
security and validity of the elections would be dubious due to the United States’
policies towards Sunnis, such as mass detention and raids on mosques, as well as
the United States’ siege of Fallujah, a city home to many Sunni Islamic leaders.303
Al-Adhadh encouraged Sunnis to participate despite the pervasive notion that the
election would not be fair towards Sunnis by arguing that boycotting the elections
would leave the Sunnis with no voice in Iraq’s new government.304 For his
attempts to drive Sunnis to the polls to avoid the (ultimately real) scenario of low
Sunni participation leading to underrepresentation of Sunnis in Iraq’s new
government, al-Adhadh and his family received threats of violence.305
In the film, even Kurds were doubtful about the idea that an election could
be conducted legitimately given the tension and violence experienced across large
swaths of the country, particularly in areas with large Sunni populations such as
Baghdad. As a Kurdish security sub-contractor put it in the film, “[w]e like
America, we are pro-American, especially my tribe, my family, we are proAmericans, pro-coalition, but when something is wrong [it] is wrong. [If] you are
my friend, [when] you make mistakes I have to tell you that this is wrong,” citing
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the lack of power, water, and security in Baghdad as indicators that the first
election would be viewed as little more than a “show.”306
Overall, the first Iraqi election had a 58 percent voter turnout rate and
people largely voted in accordance with their sectarian and ethnic identities.307
For example, about 95 percent of Kurds voted for the Kurdistan Alliance (a
Kurdish nationalist party) and 75 percent of Shi’as voted for the United Iraqi
Alliance (or UIA, a party made up of mostly Shi’a and religious authorities).308
Importantly, Sunnis only controlled about five percent of seats in the newly
constituted Iraqi parliament despite making up about 20 percent of Iraq’s
population because 75 percent of Sunnis boycotted the election (either of their
own free will or because of intimidation by Sunni and Baathist insurgent groups)
meaning that their voice was significantly diluted in the creation of Iraq’s new
government and the drafting of Iraq’s constitution.309 As a result, Sunni Arabs
attempted to delegitimize the Iraqi elections by painting them as a “U.S.
imperialist endeavor while giving a silent nod to the threats and intimidation
employed by the Sunni insurgents.”310
The fact that the Sunnis largely boycotted the January 2005 elections left
them in a difficult position. The Sunni boycott resulted in the Sunnis only winning
seventeen out of the 275 seats in the National Assembly despite Sunnis
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comprising about 20 percent of Iraq’s population.311 Recognizing that they would
not be able to influence the creation of the constitution, the elected Sunnis
attempted to appeal to Article 61(c) of the Transitional Administrative Law
(TAL) that had been put in place by the 25-member Iraqi Governing Council, the
members of which were selected by the United States and were largely unknown
to the Iraq public.312 Article 61(c) gives any three of Iraq’s 18 governorates the
power to veto any constitutional draft by a two-thirds majority and was originally
included in the TAL at the request of Kurdish parties to ensure that the Kurds
were not disadvantaged by the Iraqi constitution due to Iraq being predominantly
Arab.313 The Sunnis utilized this provision to ensure representation in the drafting
process, and by December 2005, the groups had come up with a draft that they
were able to put to the public for a vote.
The Sunnis’ realization that trying to delegitimize the elections was not
going to benefit them and their successful threats to use Article 61(c) to derail the
drafting of the constitution resulted in the Sunnis gaining more representation in
the existing government and the ability to join the constitution-drafting
committee. The United States helped broker a deal between the Sunnis, Shi’a, and
Kurds to include the Sunnis due to a recognition that doing so was necessary to
combat Sunni insurgency and draft the constitution.314 As the group with the most

311

Jonathan Morrow, “Iraq's Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost,” United States
Institute of Peace, December 1, 2005, https://www.usip.org/publications/2005/12/iraqsconstitutional-process-ii-opportunity-lost.
312
Ibid.
313
Ibid.
314
Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring
Democracy to Iraq, Chapter Six.

103

to lose per se, the Sunnis refused to validate the constitution-drafting committee’s
first draft of the constitution for fear that it was going to create a federal structure
with a northern Kurdish region and a Shi’a southern region (both of which would
have control over most of Iraq’s oil), with a resource-bereft Sunni central
region.315
To overcome Sunni opposition, the Kurds and Shi’a consented to Sunni
demands that the issues they had identified (primarily being Sunni fears over a
federal structure that put them at an economic disadvantage) would be addressed
in amendments to the constitution that would be made following the adoption of
the constitution. Despite Sunni leaders encouraging their people to vote for the
new constitution given the stipulations of its approval, the Sunni public nearly
defeated the adoption of the constitution at the polls since three Sunni provinces
registered a negative vote of over 50 percent.316
In subsequent Iraqi elections, a multi-tiered districted proportional
representation system was utilized instead of the single nationwide district
proportional representation system. Under the new system, votes cast in a
governorate were divided by the number of allocated seats to produce a
“governorate quota.”317 Any party that saw results exceeding the governorate
quota was allocated one seat with further seats allocated in multiples of the quota.
This process was repeated in every governorate to fill the 230 district-based
Assembly seats with an additional 45 seats distributed first among the parties that
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failed to pass the barrier in a single governorate but garnered enough support
nationally to satisfy the “national electoral quota,” and then among all
participating parties with seats allocated by their percentage of the national vote
garnered.318
This system addressed primarily Sunni complaints that the single
nationwide district system put the group at a disadvantage and resulted in a higher
Sunni turnout in subsequent elections.319 For example, Anbar, the Sunni-majority
district that had the lowest voter turnout in the country in the January 2005
election, saw its voter turnout percentage leap from 2.42 percent of the eligible
voting population to 38.35 percent in the October 2005 election and then to 86.37
percent in the December 2005 election.321
Other factors that most certainly contributed to the increase in Sunni
participation seen in the October and December elections were the
implementation of new security measures, including an all-Iraqi security
perimeter around polling stations, increased auxiliary U.S. military support before
and after election days, recruitment of Sunni poll workers, and even coordination
with Sunni insurgents in Sunni-majority districts.322 Even with the additional
protection measures, Sunni politicians who advocated participation in elections
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and rejected violence were oftentimes “gunned down in broad daylight” or killed
in “coordinated attacks on party headquarters.”323
While subsequent elections saw increased voter turnout and more
adequate precautionary measures implemented, sectarianism still deeply pervaded
the Iraqi elections. The subsequent Iraqi elections in 2005 mainly saw each ethnic
and religious group playing to their bases rather than trying to coalition build,
effectively turning the elections into identity referendums.324
For example, Sunni coalitions accused the United Iraqi Alliance (Iraq’s
largest Shi’a party that led the transitional government) of inadequacy in terms of
providing basic services such as electricity, jobs, health care, and security,
especially in Sunni-majority districts.325 Likewise, the Sunni coalitions played up
the issue of the UIA’s relationship with Iran (the prominent Shi’a leader Iyad
Allawi had previously stated that the UIA would “continue doing Iran’s bidding
in Iraq”), suggesting that the UIA’s coziness with the Iranian government would
result in civil war within Iraq.326
Likewise, Kurdish autonomy was non-negotiable from the get-go; the
Kurds were unwilling to be a part of Iraq if Kurdistan were not integrated into
Iraq via a federalist structure that would allow Kurdistan to operate with a large
degree of autonomy.327 While the Sunnis and Shi’a recognized that federalism
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needed to be a part of Iraq in order to appease the Kurds, it did lead to great
concern on behalf of the Sunnis that they would be left with control of very little
of Iraq’s equity in terms of oil and gas should Shi’a groups (primarily UIA
leadership and one of the UIA’s constituent groups, the Islamic Supreme Council
of Iraq, or SCIRI) collaborate to create a super-region in the south where Shi’a
support is strongest and most of Iraq’s resources are concentrated.328
Similarly, the idea of intermingling religion and politics was opposed by
most Sunni groups, mainly because of Sunni fears that Iraqi Shi’a would attempt
to secede to their co-religionist neighbor Iran (taking with them the south’s
resources) as well as the Sunnis’ aversion to making Shi’a Islam the driving force
behind Iraqi policy.329 The UIA did attempt to downplay the issue of religion in
politics by stating that religion was only “one of several factors it would use to
shape public policy,” but it did little to assuage Sunni fears that the UIA would
utilize its relationship with Iran to help create a Shi’a super-region in the south
that would contain over 80 percent of Iraq’s oil.330
The December 2005 elections had a voter turnout rate of 76 percent.331
The Kurds led the way in terms of turnout with the Kurdish governorate of Erbil
yielding the country’s highest participation at 95.26 of eligible voters.332 The
Sunni provinces saw a huge increase in voter participation with the Sunnimajority governorate of Anbar yielding an 86.37 percent turnout rate,
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approximately 43 times the participation rate seen in the first Iraqi election when
Anbar’s turnout was barely over two percent.333
Although Shi’a turnout rates were not as impressive as the Kurds’ and
Sunnis’ rates in their dominant governorates, the sheer numerical advantage Shi’a
have within Iraq resulted in the UIA receiving 41.2 percent of the national vote,
granting them 128 seats in the Assembly. The Kurdistan Alliance came in second
nationally with 21.7 percent of the vote and the Sunni’s Accord Front came in
third with 15.1 percent of the vote.334
Although the CPA’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IECI),
political parties, and coalitions deployed ample resources to observe the election
(the chief electoral officer said that this was “one of the most observed [elections]
in the whole world,”) the UIA’s victory was disputed.335 Due to allegations that
the Independent High Electoral Commission (IECI) was “doing the UIA’s
bidding,” the IECI invited an international commission to look into allegations
surrounding voter fraud.336 The international commission found that infractions
had indeed occurred, but that they would not have changed the outcome of the
election, resulting in the certification of the election results on February 10,
2006.337
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The ramifications of the December 2005 Iraqi elections are quite
significant in terms of understanding the difficulty in democratizing Iraq. In every
governorate within Iraq, the majority ethnic or religious group won the vast
majority of seats the governorates had to offer; Shi’a governorates voted for the
UIA or other Shi’a groups, Kurds voted for Kurdish parties, and Sunnis voted for
Sunni parties.338 The Iraqi List, a secular Iraqi party that was favored by the Bush
administration, garnered only 8 percent of the vote in Iraq as Table 1 shows,
killing any dream the United States had of creating a democratic Iraqi government
devoid of religious underpinnings.339
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Despite the prevalence of sectarianism in the December 2005 elections,
the inability of any party to attain an outright majority necessitated that Iraqis of
different religions and ethnicities work together to acquire the two-thirds of the
National Assembly required to form a government.340 Similarly, intra-group
differences are significant enough across ethnically and religiously similar parties
that coalition building outside of identity might be possible. Intra-group
differences can be seen most clearly when examining the Shi’a groups making up
the UIA. For example, the Sadrists, one of the UIA’s constituent groups that has a
“pronounced affinity with Sunni groups,” does not support the UIA and SCIRI
leadership’s desire to create a super-region in the south of Iraq.341 Likewise, the
al-Fadhila faction of the UIA has expressed a desire to work with the Iraqi List,
breaking with UIA dogma.342
Being much smaller, the Sunni and Kurdish coalitions’ might not be as
prone to breakage as the UIA, yet there are certainly differences between
members of each group, particularly in terms of religious fundamentalism within
the Sunni groups and the degree of autonomy desired by Kurdish factions that
could open up possibilities for members of these groups to cross ethnic and
religious lines to govern.343
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Coercive Democratization in Iraq: Success or Failure?

The United States’ democratization effort in Iraq is extraordinarily
complicated, especially when the effort is viewed holistically. On the one hand,
the United States did succeed in increasing the political and personal freedoms of
Iraqis, who had long been ruled autocratically, and significantly expanded the
rights and political power of long-marginalized groups such as the Shi’a and
Kurds. On the other hand, the United States’ democratization effort resulted in
significant loss of life within the country and made Iraq far more unstable
internally due to the proliferation of insurgent groups within the country
following the United States’ 2003 invasion. Similarly, Iraq still does not live up to
the expectations of a democratic state in terms of religious and social tolerance.
These phenomena pose the serious question, was coercive democratization in Iraq
a success or a failure?
Perhaps the most serious factor in determining whether it is accurate to
categorize the United States’ democratization effort in Iraq as a success or as a
failure is the sheer number of people who died as a result of the United States’
attempt to democratize Iraq. According to researchers at the University of
Washington Department of Global Health there were about 461,000 excessive
deaths directly attributable to the Iraq War.344 60% of the deaths are attributable to
violence resulting from the war whereas an additional 40% of the deaths are
attributable to war-related causes, such as destroyed infrastructure and a
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hamstrung health care system.345 While not denying the good that arose from the
United States’ democratization of Iraq, there is a serious argument to be made that
the sheer loss of life the democratization effort brought to Iraq might indeed
delegitimize the practice of coercive democratization or at the very least put the
coercive democratization of Iraq into the failure category by default.
This is an especially convincing argument given all of the blunders that
the United States made in democratizing Iraq. Perhaps the most significant
blunder the U.S. made pertaining to the loss of life parameter was the United
States’ decisions to completely disband the Iraqi Army and forbid Baath Party
members from serving in the new government. Doing so alienated a well-armed
group that was already going to be resistant to the idea of a democratic Iraq (the
Arab Sunnis) due to the loss of power the minority was going to experience via a
popularly elected government by stripping many members of the Sunni
community of their livelihoods; a major portion of the Baathist Iraqi Army was
Sunni Arab. Likewise, many Baath Party members were only members of the
party due to the social mobility that came with Baath Party membership in
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the fledgling democratic state of Iraq was
deprived of many civil servants who could have contributed to repairing Iraq’s
critical infrastructure due to a heavy-handed decree to eject Iraqis from public
service positions based primarily on party affiliation.
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Although the United States’ invasion of Iraq did transform Iraq into a
democracy with universal suffrage, Freedom House, a non-profit nongovernmental organization that researches political freedom, democracy, and
human rights around the world considers Iraq “not free” in its 2021 rankings,
scoring the country at 29 out of 100 possible points. 346 There are several major
reasons for Iraq’s current abysmal ranking in terms of the political and civil rights
enjoyed by its people. Currently, many of the issues Iraq faces stem from the
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, but the wildcard of COVID-19 largely serves the
purpose of highlighting the vestiges of more endemic problems within the Iraqi
state rather than creating new problems.
For example, Iraq’s already subpar health system was unable to handle the
volume of patients needing treatment during the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic and lockdowns imposed by Iraqi and Kurdistan Regional Government
authorities to combat the spread of COVID-19 were in actuality used to put down
protests and curtail free speech.347 The lockdowns also increased financial
hardship experienced by the country’s low-wage workers and business owners.348
Likewise, 1.3 million Iraqis remain internally displaced as a result of the
violence that occurred surrounding the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIS) terrorist organization which formed in 2006 as a response to the
United States’ 2003 invasion. ISIS’ violent operations since 2006 have
significantly hindered Iraq’s ability to rebuild critical infrastructure and protect its
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citizens’ liberties and persons.349 Although the group’s power has diminished
since the Iraqi government’s forces successfully drove the group out of its
stronghold in Mosul in 2017, ISIS’ presence in the region is a direct result of the
United States’ invasion and actively detracts from the quality of life and safety of
Iraqis.350
Civil liberties are also not frequently protected by the Iraqi government.
Iraq is an extremely socially conservative country and women’s, as well as
LGBT, rights are significantly limited. For example, while both the Council of
Representatives of Iraq (CoR) and Kurdish parliament have quota systems in
place to ensure that there are women representatives in the bodies, women are
typically forbidden from participating in debates and are barred from holding
leadership positions, in effect nullifying their inclusion in the political process (as
Freedom House reports, “such formal representation has had little obvious effect
on state policies toward women,”).351 Members of the LGBT community also are
“unable to enjoy equal political rights in practice” due to social intolerance of the
lifestyle in Iraq.352 In a similar vein, the official Iraqi educational dogma is
plagued by sectarian and religious instructors teaching from their own viewpoints
to the detriment of social cohesion.353 Likewise, educators who teach or discuss
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topics that influential state or nonstate actors disapprove of oftentimes face threats
of violent repercussion.354
In other words, while the United States has succeeded in creating regular,
competitive elections in the state, Iraq is no true democracy as a result of the 2003
invasion. The question that remains to be addressed is whether or not Iraq is better
off following the United States’ invasion than it was under the rule of Sadam
Hussein.
Under Sadam Hussein, one group (the Sunni Arabs) was significantly
favored over the Kurds and Shi’a Arabs. Hussein also pursued genocidal
campaigns against the Kurds (an estimated 50,000-100,000 perished during
Hussein’s Anfal campaigns) and deportation campaigns against the Shi’a (35,000
Shi’a were deported to Iran at the behest of Hussein).355 In total, Hussein’s rule of
Iraq resulted in the deaths or disappearances of about 250,000 Iraqis.357
In fact, Freedom House notes that while Iraq was under the rule of
Hussein from the 1970s until 2003, Iraq was significantly less free than the
country has been since the United States’ 2003 invasion in terms of both political
rights and civil liberties.358 That being said, Human Rights Watch, a human rights
non-profit research and advocacy group, has come to the conclusion that the
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United States’ invasion of Iraq cannot be justified under the guise of humanitarian
intervention.359 The group’s specific language for taking this position is as
follows:
Brutal as Saddam Hussein's reign had been, the scope of the Iraqi
government's killing in March 2003 was not of the exceptional and dire
magnitude that would justify humanitarian intervention. We have no illusions
about Saddam Hussein's vicious inhumanity. Having devoted extensive time and
effort to documenting his atrocities, we estimate that in the last twenty-five years
of Ba`th Party rule the Iraqi government murdered or "disappeared" some quarter
of a million Iraqis, if not more. In addition, one must consider such abuses as
Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers. However, by the time of
the March 2003 invasion, Saddam Hussein's killing had ebbed.360
In other words, by the time that the United States decided to invade in
2003, the worst of Hussein’s killings had already transpired. What followed the
United States’ attempt at democratizing Iraq was an additional 461,000 Iraqi
deaths.361 While it would be unfair to say that had no intervention occurred these
deaths would never have taken place, it is difficult to claim that the current state
of a democratic Iraq is all that different than the autocratic Iraq that existed under
Hussein 18 years prior. Yes, elections are regular, voting rights are universal, and
there are no more state-sanctioned expulsions or genocides, but sectarianism still
drives most political decisions, violence is still widespread, infrastructure still
leaves much to be desired, and political and social equality has not been fully
attained for all members of Iraqi society, women and LGBT Iraqis in particular.
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In order to characterize Iraq’s democratization as a success, the occupation
would have needed to make greater gains and fewer people would have had to
perish. The mistakes made by the United States during its democratization effort
exacerbated or failed to address the existing problems surrounding ethnic and
religious identity that Iraq has historically grappled with and have resulted in
losses of life exceeding that seen under Hussein’s brutally repressive Baathist
regime. Therefore, the coercive democratization of Iraq is indeed a failure in spite
of the clear gains that were made in regard to the transition of Iraq from an
autocracy to a democracy.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Coercive democratization, or the act of an occupying country imposing
democracy upon an occupied nation, has become a hotly contested topic
following the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003. The democratization of Iraq
is viewed as a failure by many people who assisted in the democratization of Iraq,
such as political scientist Larry Diamond and Ambassador Barbara Bodine, due to
the loss of life and destabilization that occurred in Iraq following the United
States’ occupation. That being said, the United States’ occupation and coercive
democratization of Japan was a resounding success, with Japan attaining a high
standard of living and its people enjoying life in a democratic society.
In other words, Japan and Iraq certainly experienced two very different
outcomes from their experiences undergoing coercive democratization at the
hands of the United States, and there are several distinctions between the states of
Iraq and Japan that help to explain the lacuna in outcomes for coercive
democratization between the two countries.
The differences between the states of Iraq and Japan begin with their
statuses prior to the United States’ occupations. First off, Iraq is a heterogenous
society. Iraq’s population consists of three major ethnic and religious groups,
being Arab Sunnis, Arab Shi’a and Kurds, most of which are Sunni. These groups
account for about 20, 60, and 20 percent of Iraq’s population respectively. Japan,
on the other hand, is a homogeneous society; about 98% of people living in Japan
are ethnically Japanese. Religion also plays a much smaller role in Japanese
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society than it does in Iraqi society, meaning there is one less identity upon which
divisions can form in Japan.
Another related difference is the turbulent past that Iraq has experienced.
The area that now constitutes the modern-day state of Iraq was originally three
separate vilayets, or governing districts, under the Ottoman Empire, each of which
were oriented towards one distinct ethnic or religious group. The vilayet of Bursa,
located in the south of Iraq, was predominantly Shi’a, the vilayet of Baghdad,
located in the central region of Iraq, was heavily influenced by the Sunni, and the
vilayet of Mosul was predominantly Kurdish. Each vilayet operated with a
significant degree of autonomy as well. Since the Ottoman Empire was a Sunni
empire, Sunnis were favored for lucrative jobs in the Ottoman government,
alienating the Shi’a and Kurds.
The Sunnis continued to prosper under the British who combined the three
Ottoman vilayets and created the modern-day boundaries of Iraq, and then once
again prospered under the rule of Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party once the
group began consolidating political power in the 1970s. Ethnic and religious
tension significantly increased under Hussein as he engaged in the ethnic
cleansing of Kurds and mass deportation of Shi’a to neighboring Iran. About
35,000 Shi’a were deported by Hussein and the violence propagated against the
Kurds resulted in the Kurds operating with complete autonomy in Kurdistan, a
predominantly Kurdish region in the north of Iraq, from 1991 until 2003.
On the other hand, prior to the United States’ occupation of Japan, the
country enjoyed over 300 years of existence as an independent, internally stable
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country. In fact, Japan was a colonial power prior to the United States’ occupation
of the country with colonial possessions in Manchuria and Korea. While Iraq had
to turn its focus inward to quell infighting between the various ethnic and
religious groups that make up the country, Japan’s homogeneity and the internal
stability that allowed came along with it allowed the country to expand its
international influence.
Pickering and Peceny’s theories concerning institutional ethnic conflict
and state age certainly appear to be applicable to the cases of Japan and Iraq given
their experiences during their coercive democratizations. Whereas Iraq was
plagued by internal ethnic conflict and experienced an ethnic minority ruling via
fiat throughout most of its existence, Japan had been a country for and governed
by the Japanese right up until the United States began its occupation. The absence
of serious ethnic divisions in Japan certainly contributed to the creation of a
strong Japanese identity that served the country quite well insofar as internal strife
was concerned. The institution of the Emperor was an important unifying factor
for the Japanese people and the Japanese government was able to hold together
Japan for over 300 years without the country coming apart at the seams. Under
Pickering and Peceny’s theories, both the lack of institutional ethnic strife and the
longevity of the Japanese state are strikes in the country’s favor as to why
coercive democratization worked in Japan.
Iraq, on the other hand, has historically been highly sectarianized. This can
be seen in the division of Iraq into ethnically and religiously dominated vilayets
when it was contained within the Ottoman Empire and later on after the country
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gained its independence when an entire region of Iraq, Kurdistan, broke away
from the Baathist government of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and operated
autonomously for over a decade. Iraq is also quite a young country, Iraq only
gained its independence in 1932 after all, and throughout its independence Iraq
has been plagued by ethnic and religious violence amounting to genocidal
proportions. This is especially true from the late 1970s onward when Saddam
Hussein’s Baathist government began deporting thousands of Shi’a to Iran and
systematically exterminated Iraqi Kurds. Pickering and Peceny would attribute the
failure of Iraq to democratize to the clear ethnic tensions present in Iraqi society
as well as the relative youth of the Iraqi state, and the evidence seems to suggest
that these factors played a major role in said failure.
In addition to the statuses of Iraq and Japan differing significantly prior to
U.S. occupation, the United States also treated each occupation quite differently.
In Iraq, there was a well thought out plan to democratize Iraq formulated by Iraqi
diaspora and U.S. government experts before the United States invaded Iraq in
2003. This plan was dubbed the Future of Iraq Project and addressed several key
issues that any good plan for democratizing Iraq would have contained including
to what extent purging of Baath Party members was necessary and the type of
electoral system best suited for Iraq. However, this project was completely
discarded by the Bush Administration. Ambassador Barbara Bodine, the Coalition
Provisional Authority’s Coordinator for the Central Region of Iraq during the
initial occupation, told me in an interview that this decision was primarily a result
of Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld being
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more concerned with installing a pro-U.S. government in Iraq rather than bringing
democracy to Iraq.
Ambassador Bodine also told me in an interview that the number of troops
allocated to the democratization effort was nowhere near enough to police the
newly occupied Iraq and that her team often lacked basic protection equipment
and office supplies. The Coalition Provisional Authority also decided to hold
elections despite overwhelming Sunni opposition. This resulted in the elections
becoming an identity referendum and many Sunnis, most of whom had lost their
jobs as a result of the United States’ decision to completely dissolve the Iraqi
Army and purge Baath Party members from the Iraqi bureaucracy, did not
participate in Iraq’s first election due to the fact that, as a minority, a democratic
system would significantly favor the Shi’a, making Sunni view their participation
as pointless. The dissolution of the Iraqi Army did more damage than hurt Sunni
pride, it took away their livelihood and encouraged them to act violently. This
resulted in many well trained and well-armed Sunni forming militias and
engaging in terrorism throughout the occupation. In fact, the renowned Sunni
extremist terrorist group ISIS traces its origins to the United States’ occupation of
Iraq and is still active in the country in 2021.
In stark contrast to the occupation plans for Iraq, the occupation plans for
Japan were not only well thought out, but actualized. In fact, the Department of
State started planning for the occupation of Japan two years prior to Japan’s
surrender in 1945. Key provisions of the plans included the demilitarization of
Japan, the rewriting of the Japanese constitution, and liberalizing the Japanese
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economy somewhat by instituting land reforms and breaking up Japanese
zaibatsus, or monopolies. The demilitarization of Japan was a non-negotiable
condition on the Japanese’s surrender due to Japan’s rampant expansionism
preceding and during World War II.
In fact, Article 9 of the U.S.-imposed Japanese constitution explicitly
forbade Japan from having a military outside of a small Self-Defense Force that
was to be used for self-defense only and not be deployed outside of Japanese
territory. The United States also committed a significant amount of resources and
number of personnel to the democratization of Japan. Even before the occupation
began the United States planned on creating long-term military bases in Japan. In
other words, the United States was intent on remaining in Japan for an extended
period of time. In fact, the United States still maintains a military presence in
Japan to this day.
The United States also made the crucial decision to keep the Japanese
bureaucracy intact, thus not depriving the Japanese of their best and brightest civil
servants. The downside to keeping the old bureaucracy intact was that the new
Japanese government was very conservative and only really made marginal gains
in terms of social reformations. However, the Japanese as a people are quite
conservative, and in the first Japanese democratic elections utilizing universal
suffrage conservative candidates significantly outperformed liberal ones, thus
showing that the conservative Japanese government was in fact in place by the
will of the Japanese people.
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The results of the United States’ attempts to coercively democratize Iraq
and Japan differed in their outcomes just as they differed in their preparations and
implementations. Iraq is arguably worse off now than it was under Saddam
Hussein. Even when taking into account the ethnic cleansing and murders
committed by Hussein and the Baathist government of Iraq, more Iraqis have died
as a result of the United States’ invasion than did during Hussein’s autocratic
regime. Estimates place Hussein’s body count at around 250,000 Iraqis. Estimates
also blame the United States’ occupation of Iraq for 461,000 Iraqi deaths.
As Ambassador Bodine started while I was interviewing her, life under
Saddam Hussein for the average Iraqi was similar to living in a minimum-security
prison; so long as one toed the line and played by Hussein’s rules, one could
expect a baseline security and to have one’s basic necessities taken care of. Now,
in the absence of Hussein’s rigorous policing of Iraqi society and in the face of
the United States’ unwillingness to adequately police Iraq, Iraq is far more
dangerous than it has been in the past, and murders and kidnappings are
commonplace occurrences. Political power has also been concentrated in the
hands of the Arab Shi’a, much to the ire of the Sunni Arabs, many of whom have
turned to insurgency out of dissatisfaction with their new, diminished role in
society. Likewise, Iraq’s infrastructure never recovered from destruction caused
by fighting during the occupation, meaning education and health apparatuses have
been crippled. Although Iraqis can now cast a ballot for a political group of their
choosing, Iraqis are worse off now in their everyday lives than they were under
Hussein’s oppressive regime.
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Japan, on the other hand, has thrived since the United States transformed
the country into a democracy. The Japanese people significantly benefited from
the land reformations that the United States implemented during its occupation of
Japan. Agrarian distress was quickly identified as a reason why Japan pursued
imperialism by the U.S. government. The Japanese government was relying on
glory abroad to compensate for social injustice at home concerning the fact that
farmers were barely able to sustain themselves due to the exorbitantly high rents
prices on farmland in the country. The high rents were attributable to the
concentration of much of Japanese land in the hands of a small few landlords, and
the United States, through its land reforms, eased the suffering of the
impoverished Japanese farmers thus alleviating a source of internal tension that
would most likely have negatively influenced the coercive democratization of
Japan.
Similarly, Japan has renounced aggression and is one of the most peaceful
countries in the international community in which it plays the role of a merchant
state, thus giving the country a strong economy. The United States certainly
pursued the right course of action for democratizing Japan, suggesting that the
long-term results of an attempt at coercive democratization requires leaving at
least some apparatus of the occupied state’s government in place and a long-term
presence (or in this case an indefinite presence) by the occupier to be successful.
Indeed, right-wing parties have thrived in Japan’s democratic government, yet
there is nothing inherently wrong with that, especially since the Japanese people
have chosen to live their lives that way via voting. Japan has also not had to worry
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about funding a military program since the United States began providing military
protection for Japan following occupation, freeing up the country’s finances to
invest in areas such as technology, which has paid off tremendously for the
country economically.
The fact of the matter is that both of the discussed coercive
democratization efforts in Japan and Iraq were pre-planned by the United States’
government. However, the U.S. only implemented the plan it had for the coercive
democratization of Japan. As a result, Japan has prospered economically and
socially and Iraq remains unstable, economically crippled, and far more unsafe
than Japan.
There is a strong argument to be made that Japan was simply more primed
for democracy than Iraq was; after all, Japan had a history of internal stability and
was a homogeneous society before it was a democracy, and political science
theories back up claims that these factors positively influence the ability of a
country to democratize. These theories, however, do not by themselves account
for the fact that the United States simply did not follow the plan that it had
commissioned for Iraq and that had been worked on for 18 months by people who
were familiar with Iraq.
The plan had within it ideas that would have prevented the disastrous
complete dissolution of the Iraqi military, prevented the widespread looting and
destruction of government buildings, and addressed some of the problems, such as
ensuring equal treatment, equal representation, and ensuring some degree of
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satisfaction for all groups involved, that arise from democratizing a highly
sectarianized society.
That being said, there is some validity in Pickering and Peceny’s theory that
institutional ethnic conflict negatively correlates with a country’s ability to
democratize. Indeed, the turbulent history of Iraq has contributed at least partially
to the failure to democratize Iraq. For example, there exists much tension between
the Sunnis, Shi’a, and Kurds due to the fact that Sunnis have been in control of
governing Iraq from the time of the Ottomans onward, and oftentimes used their
authority to oppress the Shi’a and the Kurds. The residual resentment that no
doubt exists between the now politically dominant majority group, the Shi’a, and
the now deposed minority group the Sunnis, will continue to be an issue in the
experiment of Iraqi democracy as some Sunni groups resort to violence to regain
their lost power and the Shi’a cozy up to Iran, threatening to plunge the country
into civil war. Likewise, the Kurds’ desire for autonomy has been a perennial
problem for each group that has tried to rule Iraq and it does not appear that the
Kurdish problem has been adequately addressed via the United States’
democratization attempt.
In reality, the successful coercive democratization of Japan and the
unsuccessful coercive democratization of Iraq can largely be explained by the
different levels of commitment each democratization attempt received from the
United States in terms of resource allocation and policy implementation as well as
the historic stability and homogeneity of Japan and the historic instability and
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heterogeneity of Iraq.
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